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Phishing continues to be an invasive threat to computer and mobile device users.
Cybercriminals continuously develop new phishing schemes using e-mail and malicious
search engine links to gather the personal information of unsuspecting users. This
information is used for financial gains through identity theft schemes or draining victims'
financial accounts. Many users of varying demographic backgrounds fall victim to
phishing schemes at one time or another. Users are often distracted and fail to process the
phishing attempts fully, then unknowingly fall victim to the scam until much later. Users
operating mobile phones and computers are likely to make judgment errors when making
decisions in distracting environments due to cognitive overload. Distracted users cannot
distinguish between legitimate and malicious emails or search engine results correctly.
Mobile phone users can have a harder time distinguishing malicious content due to the
smaller screen size and the limited security features in mobile phone applications.
The main goal of this research study was to design, develop, and validate experimental
settings to empirically test if there are significant mean differences in users’ judgment
when: exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing &
Potentially Malicious Search Engine Results (PMSER)), based on the interaction of the
kind of environment (distracting vs. non-distracting) and type of device used (mobile vs.
computer). This research used field experiments to test whether users are more likely to
fall for phishing schemes in a distracting environment while using mobile phones or
desktop/laptop computers. The second phase included a pilot test with 10 participants
testing the Subject Matter Experts (SME) validated tasks and measures. The third phase
included the delivery of the validated tasks and measures that were revised through the
pilot testing phase with 68 participants.
The results of the first phase have SME validated two sets of experimental tasks and eight
experimental protocols to assess the measures of users’ judgment when exposed to two
types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER) in two kinds of
environments (distracting vs. non-distracting) and two types of devices (mobile phone vs.
computer). The second phase results, the phishing mini-IQ test results, do not follow
what was initially indicated in prior literature. Specifically, it was surprising to learn that
the non-distracting environment results for the Phishing IQ tests were overall lower than
those of distracting environment, which is counter to what was envisioned. These
Phishing IQ test results may be assumed to be because, during the distracting
environment, the participants were monitored over zoom to enable the distracting sound
file. In contrast, in the non-distracting environment, they have marked the selections
independently and may have rushed to identify the phishing samples.
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In contrast, PMSER detection on a computer outperformed mobile devices. It is
suspected that these results are more accurate as individuals’ familiarity with PMSER is
much lower. Their habituation to such messages is more deficient, causing them to pay
closer attention and be more precise in their detections. A two-way Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) was conducted on the results. While it appears that some variations do exist,
none of the comparisons were significant for Phishing IQ tests by environment (F=3.714,
p=0.061) or device type (F=0.380, p=0.541), and PMSER IQ tests by environment
(F=1.383, p=0.247) or device type (F=0.228, p=0.636). The results for the final phase
showed there were no significant differences among both groups for Phishing and
PMSER (F=0.985, p=0.322) and PMSER (F=3.692, p=0.056) using a two-way ANOVA.
The two-way ANOVA results also showed significant differences among both groups for
Phishing and PMSER vs. Device Type and Environment, Phishing (F=3.685, p=0.013),
PMSER (F=1.629, p=0.183). A two-way ANOVA was evaluated for significant
differences between groups. The results of the two-way ANOVA showed there were
significant differences among both groups for Phishing and PMSER vs. Device Type and
Environment. Phishing (F=3.685, p=0.013), PMSER (F=1.629, p=0.183). The p-values of
the F-test for the Phishing IQ vs. Device Type and Environment were lower than the .05
level of significance. The two-way Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) results showed
significant differences between Phishing vs. Environment and Device Type plus PMSER
vs. Environment and Device Type. Specifically, the Education covariate for Table
32(F=3.930, p=0.048), Table 33(F=3.951, p=0.048), Table 34(F=10.429, p=0.001), and
Table 35(F=10.329, p=0.001) was lower than the .05 level of significance.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Background
Phishing and malware/ransomware infection from emails, along with Potentially
Malicious Search Engine Results (PMSER), inflict significant financial losses to
individuals and organizations (Anderson et al., 2013; Choo, 2011; Wright & Marett,
2010). Cybercriminals use increasingly ingenious schemes to take advantage of users'
judgment errors when dealing with phishing emails and PMSER (Dhamija et al., 2006;
Leontiadis et al., 2014). Phishing is a subcategory of Social Engineering and is defined as
“a type of cyber attack that sits at the intersection of social engineering and security
technologies” (McElwee et al., 2018, p. 1). These phishing schemes often use officiallooking logos to distract the target from the spelling inconsistencies or embedded fake
links in the e-mail (Dhamija et al., 2006; Wright & Marett, 2010). Phishing continues to
be an invasive threat to computer and mobile device users (McElwee et al., 2018).
Cybercriminals continuously develop new phishing schemes using e-mail and malicious
search engine links to gather the personal information of unsuspecting users (Anderson et
al., 2013). This information is used for financial gains through identity theft schemes or
draining victims' financial accounts (Anderson et al., 2013; Marett & Wright, 2009;
Moody et al., 2017).
Deceptive search engine results pose a problem because cybercriminals often
manipulate the results algorithms through search poisoning techniques, which promote
malicious links to the first page of the search engine results (John et al., 2011; Leontiadis
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et al., 2014). Users of mobile phones, in particular, are more vulnerable to phishing
attacks than those who use Personal Computers (PCs) due to poor fraudulent website
detection of some mobile browsers along with the limitation of the smaller screen
(Mavroeidis & Nicho, 2017; Tsalis et al., 2015; Virvilis et al., 2014). Mobile phone apps
such as Quick Response (QR) code readers also pose a phishing attack vector because of
the difficulty differentiating an actual QR code from a hijacked one (Dabrowski et al.,
2014; Focardi et al., 2018; Mavroeidis & Nicho, 2017). Mobile phones are often the
primary platform users utilize to access various web-based platforms, exposing them to
phishing and clickbait schemes (Frauenstein & Flowerday, 2016). Users tend to take their
mobile phones everywhere, which poses a situation for making judgment errors in
distracting environments (Karakasiliotis et al., 2006). The term judgment error refers to
individuals making a wrong or bad decision that usually involves calculated risks,
evaluating options, and executive decision making (Chowdhury, 2016, p. 42). Even in
non-distracting environments such as a business office or home-office setting, it was
indicated in prior research that users still have a hard time judging the legitimacy of
emails and web links on their PC, being a desktop or laptop (Furnell, 2007).
Overconfidence in one’s abilities and failure to recognize phishing campaigns'
risks leads to judgmental errors (Schneier & West, 2008; Vishwanath et al., 2011; Wang
et al., 2016). Judgment errors have been documented in research to cause users to fall
prey to cybercriminals (Schneier & West, 2008; Vishwanath et al., 2011; Wang et al.,
2016). People judge different events with a degree of uncertainty that can lead to
judgmental errors (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1983).
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With the sophistication of the current phishing schemes, intuitive thinking often fails
because people miss visual cues due to being distracted by various visual or audible
elements in the environment (Nicholson et al., 2005; Wright, 1974).
While logical thinking provides the ability to make logical choices in decision
making, it often fails as well due to errors in judgment (Kahneman, 2011).
Cybercriminals continue to take advantage of mobile phone or PC users' judgment errors
to enrich themselves. A user's vulnerability to phishing attempts is affected by their
ability to keep their information secure (Chin et al., 2012; Fette et al., 2007; Li et al.,
2014). While there are plenty of literature and training materials on ways to avoid falling
for phishing scams, there is also evidence in the literature that users tend to be
unmotivated or ignore the visual cues in emails or web links due to security not being
their primary concern (Kumaraguru et al., 2007; Williams et al., 2018). Moreover, it was
indicated that “environmental distractions can impact cognitive performance, whether
this concerns solving a mathematical problem, maintaining a conversation, or retrieving
an experienced event from memory” (Vredeveldt & Perfect, 2014, p. 1).
A distracting environment can occur in any setting with constant interruptions
from background noise and music (Dalton & Behm, 2007; Larsby et al., 2008; Sanders &
Baron, 1975). This distraction will lead to increased vulnerabilities to personal devices
and PCs both in public as well as at work (Halevi et al., 2013; Kallinen, 2004). With the
added distractions causing judgment errors in the workplace and social environments, due
to an ever-increasing reliance on connected devices, it appears that there is a need to
assess the role of environment and device type on the success of social engineering
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attacks (Karakasiliotis et al., 2006; Mansi, 2011; Williams et al., 2018). Thus, the main
goal of this research study is to design, develop, and validate a set of experiments using
an expert panel as a first step while later empirically testing the validated set of
experiments with participants to assess if there are significant mean differences in users’
judgment, when: exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing
& PMSER), based on the interaction of the kind of environment (distracting vs. nondistracting) and type of device used (mobile vs. computer).
Problem Statement
The research problem that this study addressed is financial losses to individuals
and organizations due to phishing and malware/ransomware infection from emails and
Potentially Malicious Search Engine Results (PMSER) (Anderson et al., 2013; Choo,
2011; Wright & Marett, 2010). Cybercriminals use increasingly ingenious schemes to
take advantage of users’ judgment errors when dealing with phishing emails and PMSER
(Dhamija et al., 2006; Leontiadis et al., 2014). Phishing is a subcategory of Social
Engineering and is defined as “a type of cyber attack that sits at the intersection of social
engineering and security technologies” (McElwee et al., 2018, p. 1). These phishing
schemes often use official-looking logos to distract the target from the spelling
inconsistencies or embedded fake links in the e-mail (Dhamija et al., 2006; Wright &
Marett, 2010). Deceptive Search Engine Results (SER) pose a problem because
cybercriminals often manipulate the SER algorithms through search poisoning
techniques, which promote malicious links to the first page of the SER (John et al., 2011;
Leontiadis et al., 2014). In particular, mobile phones are more vulnerable to phishing
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attacks than PCs due to poor fraudulent website detection of some mobile browsers such
as Chrome Mobile and Opera Mini (Mavroeidis & Nicho, 2017; Tsalis et al., 2015;
Virvilis et al., 2014). Mobile phone apps such as Quick Response (QR) code readers also
pose a phishing attack vector because of the difficulty differentiating an actual QR code
from a hijacked one (Dabrowski et al., 2014; Focardi et al., 2018; Mavroeidis & Nicho,
2017). Mobile phones are often the primary platform users utilize to access various webbased platforms, exposing them to phishing and clickbait schemes (Frauenstein &
Flowerday, 2016). Users tend to take their mobile phones everywhere, which poses a
situation for making judgment errors in distracting environments (Karakasiliotis et al.,
2006). “The dictionary meaning of “error of judgment” is “making a bad or wrong
decision,” it usually involves calculated risks, evaluating options, and executive decision
making” (Chowdhury, 2016, p. 42). Even in nondistracting environments such as an
office setting, it is well known in research that users still have difficulty judging the
legitimacy of emails and web links on their PC, being a desktop or laptop (Furnell, 2007).
Overconfidence in one’s abilities and failure to recognize the risks of phishing campaigns
leads to judgmental errors. Judgment errors have been documented in research to cause
users to fall prey to cybercriminals (Schneier & West, 2008; Vishwanath et al., 2011;
Wang et al., 2016). Various demographic indicators such as (a) age, (b) gender, (c)
education, and (d) level of social media usage also play a role in phishing judgmental
errors (Frauenstein & Flowerday, 2016; Sheng et al., 2010). People judge different events
with a degree of uncertainty that can lead to judgmental errors (Kahneman & Tversky,
1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1983). With the sophistication of the current phishing
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schemes, intuitive thinking often fails because people miss visual cues due to being
distracted by various visual or audible elements in the environment (Nicholson et al.,
2005; Wright, 1974). While logical thinking provides the ability to make logical choices
in decision making, it often fails as well due to errors in judgment (Kahneman, 2011).
Cybercriminals continue to take advantage of mobile phone or PC users’ judgment errors
to enrich themselves. A user’s vulnerability to phishing attempts is affected by their
ability to keep their information secure (Chin et al., 2012; Fette et al., 2007; Li et al.,
2014). While there are plenty of literature and training materials on ways to avoid falling
for phishing scams, users tend to be unmotivated or ignore the visual cues in emails or
web links due to security not being their primary concern (Kumaraguru et al., 2007;
Williams et al., 2018). “Environmental distractions can impact cognitive performance,
whether this concerns solving a mathematical problem, maintaining a conversation, or
retrieving an experienced event from memory” (Vredeveldt & Perfect, 2014, p. 1). A
distracting environment can occur in any setting with constant interruptions from
background noise and music (Dalton & Behm, 2007; Larsby et al., 2008; Sanders &
Baron, 1975). This distraction will lead to increased vulnerabilities to personal devices
and PCs both in public as well as at work (Halevi et al., 2013; Kallinen, 2004). With the
added distractions causing judgment errors in the workplace and social environments, due
to an ever-increasing reliance on connected devices, it appears that there is a need to
assess the role of environment and device type on the success of social engineering
attacks (Karakasiliotis et al., 2006; Mansi, 2011; Williams et al., 2018).
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Research Goals
The main goal of this research study is to design, develop, and validate
experimental settings to empirically test if there are significant mean differences in users’
judgment when: exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing &
PMSER), based on the interaction of the kind of environment (distracting vs. nondistracting) and type of device used (mobile phone vs. computer). The need for this work
was demonstrated by Anderson et al. (2013), Furnell (2007), Karakasiliotis et al. (2006),
Sheng et al. (2010), as well as Nicholson et al. (2005). Anderson et al. (2013) found that
there is a combination of direct costs, indirect costs, and defense costs that add up to
society's cost for cybercriminals' activities such as phishing attacks. These costs do not
just include monetary losses from the victims but also their loss of confidence in the
security mechanisms involved (Anderson et al., 2013). Furnell (2007) found that some
users are unable to correctly judge that a phishing e-mail is illegitimate based just on the
content. Demographic factors such as education level, age, gender, and not fully
understanding phishing play a role in users' inability to make the correct judgments (Cain
et al., 2018; Gratian et al., 2018; Oliveira et al., 2017).
This research builds on prior literature by assessing if there are any differences in
the level of distracting environments when it comes to judgment errors in users exposed
to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER), based on the
interaction of the kind of environment (distracting vs. non-distracting) and type of device
used (mobile phone vs. computer). Users who habitually share web links on their devices
tend to have low-security awareness, potentially opening them to more vulnerabilities
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(Halevi et al., 2013). Mobile phone usage proves to be too much of a temptation for some
people during work and social times, distracting them from whatever tasks that they are
performing causing detrimental effects on performance, also known as cyberslacking
(Alharthi et al., 2019; Brooks, 2015; Hernández et al., 2016). The use of mobile phones
in the working or learning environment poses a risk of multiple distractions that may
affect users ability to perform assigned tasks (Drew & Forbes, 2017; Khaddage et al.,
2015; Nicholson et al., 2005). These distractions pose an attention conflict that can
overload cognitive function, which reduces performance, leading to difficulty completing
tasks (Groff et al., 1983; Kahneman, 1973; Sanders et al., 1978). Interruptions caused by
distractions force people to focus elsewhere instead of the task they need to perform
(Speier et al., 1999, 2003). The time to complete tasks can be significantly affected by
interruptions in the work environment (Bailey et al., 2006; Mansi & Levy, 2013; Zijlstra
et al., 1999). Distractions from environmental factors are comparable to person-based
interruptions due to work time lost from the disturbance (Sanders et al., 1978; Sanders &
Baron, 1975).
The validity of this experimental research builds on prior research by Dhamija et
al. (2006), Halevi et al. (2015), Hara et al. (2009), Karakasiliotis et al. (2006), Sheng et
al. (2010), as well as Frauenstein and Flowerday (2016). Dhamija et al. (2006) were able
to fool many knowledgeable users with simple spoofing techniques. Dhamija et al. (2006)
demonstrated that even the most knowledgeable users could make judgment errors when
confronted with simple phishing schemes. Halevi et al. (2015) found that users are
unaware of their vulnerabilities to attacks, especially those that rely heavily on social
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media usage. Social media services' popularity has made it even easier for cybercriminals
to post fake links to gather personal information from a wide array of demographical
groups (Frauenstein & Flowerday, 2016).
Figure 1
2x2x2 Experimental Design Taxonomy of Device (Mobile Phone/Computer) vs.
Environment (Distracting/Non-Distracting) vs. Social Engineering Attack Type
(Phishing/PMSER)
Social Engineering Attack Type
Phishing

PMSER

Not Distracted
via Computer

Mobile Phone

Distracted via
Computer

Distracted via
Mobile Phone

Not Distracted
via Mobile
Phone

Computer

Not Distracted
via Mobile
Phone

Environment
Distracting
Non-Distracting

Device

Mobile Phone

Distracted via
Mobile Phone

Computer

Device

Environment
Distracting
Non-Distracting

Distracted via
Computer

Not Distracted
via Computer

Heavy social media usage is a possible demographic indicator in assessing user
judgment errors. Sheng et al. (2010) found that demographic factors such as gender and
age play a role in a user's susceptibility to falling for a phishing scheme. These factors
can vary with the amount of education or perception of financial risk. Karakasiliotis et al.
(2006) noted that while users often use several factors such as language, technical cues,
and visual elements to judge the legitimacy of an e-mail, they often make incorrect
decisions. Cybercriminals will often use visual similarities to imitate legitimate
companies and websites to fool people into falling victim to their phishing schemes (Hara
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et al., 2009). Figure 1 illustrates this study’s 2X2X2 experimental design taxonomy
between devices in distracting and non-distracting environments during interaction with
two types of social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER).
The six specific goals of this research study are as follows. This research study's
first specific goal is to identify and validate, using Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), two
sets of experimental tasks for the measure of users’ judgment when exposed to two types
of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER). The second specific goal of
this research study is to identify and validate, using SMEs, eight experimental protocols
to assess the measures of users’ judgment when exposed to two types of simulated social
engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER) during two kinds of environments (distracting
vs. non-distracting), and two types of devices (mobile phone vs. computer). This research
study's third specific goal is to find if there are any statistically significant mean
differences in users’ judgment when exposed to two types of simulated social engineering
attacks (phishing & PMSER) based on the kind of environment (distracting vs. nondistracting) the users are experiencing. This research study's fourth specific goal is to find
if there are any statistically significant mean differences in users’ judgment when
exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER) based
on the type of device used (mobile phone vs. computer). The fifth specific goal of this
research study is to find if there are any statistically significant mean differences in users’
judgment when exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing &
PMSER) based on the interaction of the types of environments (distracting vs. nondistracting) and type of device used (mobile phone vs. computer). The sixth specific goal
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of this research study is to find if there are any statistically significant mean differences
in users’ judgment when exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks
(phishing & PMSER) when controlled for the users: (a) gender, (b) age, (c) education,
and (d) level of social media usage.
Research Questions
The main research question that this research study addressed is: Are there any
statistically significant mean differences in users’ judgment when: exposed to two types
of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER), based on the interaction of
the kind of environment (distracting vs. non-distracting) and type of device used (mobile
phone vs. computer)?
RQ1. What are the specific SMEs identified two sets of validated experimental
tasks to assess users’ judgment when exposed to two types of simulated
social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER)?
RQ2. What are the specific SMEs identified eight experimental protocols to
assess the measures of users’ judgment when exposed to two types of
simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER), in two kinds of
environments (distracting vs. non-distracting) and two types of devices
(mobile phone vs. computer)?
RQ3. Are there significant mean differences in users’ judgment when exposed to
two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER) in
distracting vs. non-distracting environments?
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RQ4. Are there significant mean differences in users’ judgment when exposed to
two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER)
when using a mobile phone vs. a computer?
RQ5: Are there statistically significant mean differences in users’ judgment
when exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks
(phishing & PMSER), based on the interaction of the kind of environment
(distracting vs. non-distracting) and type of device used (mobile phone vs.
computer)?
RQ6: Are there any significant mean differences in users’ judgment when
exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing &
PMSER) when controlled for the users’: (a) age, (b) gender, (c) education,
and (d) level of social media usage?
Relevance and Significance
This study is relevant as it seeks to identify the vulnerabilities of Information
Systems (IS) users exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing
& PMSER), used to gain access to an individual’s personal or organizational accounts,
mainly for monetary gain (Anderson et al., 2013; Leontiadis et al., 2014). With the
widespread use of mobile phones with Internet-connected applications, phishing attempts
have increased through social engineering through scams and clickbait links (Frauenstein
& Flowerday, 2016; Halevi et al., 2013; Marett & Wright, 2009). Frauenstein and
Flowerday (2016) stated that users pick up bad habits through link-sharing applications
that leave them vulnerable to phishing attacks. These bad habits make it harder for people
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to discern between genuine and malicious links making them more susceptible to
phishing attacks (Frauenstein & Flowerday, 2016; Vishwanath et al., 2011).
This research is significant as it will advance current research in cybersecurity by
increasing the body of knowledge regarding users’ judgment when exposed to two types
of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER). Distracting environments
at work and in public make it easier for users to have errors in judgment when performing
tasks (Groff et al., 1983; Reason, 1995a; Sanders & Baron, 1975). Attackers craft
phishing attacks to distort the mental model that users form in interacting with online
transactions to distract them from the visual cues they would usually pick up on (Downs
et al., 2006). As the number of distractions increases, cognitive cues decrease, affecting
decision-making due to cognitive overload (Groff et al., 1983; Kahneman, 1973; Speier
et al., 1999). The results of this study provided significant input to the body of knowledge
of users’ susceptibility to social engineering attacks in distracting environments while
using mobile phones and computers. The results were added to the body of knowledge on
which demographic groups are more susceptible to social engineering attacks in
distracting environments.
Barriers and Issues
One potential barrier to this experimental research study is obtaining permission
to evaluate users exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing
& PMSER). Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval is needed from multiple
institutions to conduct research on human subjects. Moreover, using the Delphi technique
also poses a potential barrier. Selecting the correct SME participants who will cooperate
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with the process while avoiding induced bias in this experimental research study can be
complicated (Botterill & Platenkamp, 2014; Gordon, 2009). Collecting an adequate
number of useable responses from SMEs can also be an issue if the experiments ask
ambiguous questions (Gordon, 2009).
Limitations
This experimental research study's main limitation relies on the SME opinions
provided during the Delphi technique. SME panel participants are often volunteers who
can withdraw from the study for many reasons, which can have a negative impact (Ellis
& Levy, 2010). Combining the Delphi technique with a review of the literature can
mitigate any limitations and recruit SMEs from varying industries and academia.
An additional limitation is correctly recording and analyzing participant responses
without error. All data must be manually and visually reviewed to address this validity
and reliability issue and identify any errors. Missing data must be evaluated before the
final analysis to ensure consistency, validity, and reliability (Levy, 2006; Onwuegbuzie et
al., 2010).
Definition of Terms
Information System (IS) –
A discrete set of information resources [i.e., personnel, equipment, funds, and
information technology] organized for the collection, processing, maintenance,
use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of information. Also includes
specialized systems such as industrial/process control systems, telephone
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switching and private branch exchange (PBX) systems, and environmental control
systems. (Kissel, 2013, p. 101)
Information Technology (IT) – “The term information technology includes computers,
ancillary equipment, software, firmware, and similar procedures, services (including
support services), and related resources” (Kissel, 2013, p. 101).
Instrument – “Observational instruments or rating scales are developed to evaluate the
behaviors of subjects who are being directly observed” (Kimberlin & Winterstein, 2008,
p. 2278).
Judgment Error ‒ “Making a bad or wrong decision, usually involving calculated risks,
evaluating options, and executive decision making” (Chowdhury, 2016, p. 42).
Phishing – Phishing is a type of cyber attack that sits at the intersection of social
engineering and security technologies (McElwee et al., 2018).
Phishing IQ. test ‒ A test where “participants are informed that they are participating in
a phishing study, are presented with images of phishing and legitimate emails and are
asked to make judgments concerning the authenticity of the images” (Parsons et al.,
2015)
PMSER ‒ Potentially Malicious Search Engine Results.
Social engineering – “Techniques used to manipulate people into performing actions or
divulging confidential information” (Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Workman, 2008).
User ‒ “An individual or a process (subject) acting on behalf of the individual authorized
to access an information system” (Kissel, 2013, p. 209).
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Validity ‒ “The extent to which an instrument measures what it purports to measure.
Validity requires that an instrument is reliable, but an instrument can be reliable without
being valid” (Kimberlin & Winterstein, 2008, p. 2278).
Summary
This experimental research addressed financial losses due to users’ judgment
errors when dealing with phishing emails and PMSER. Anderson et al. (2013) found that
there is a combination of direct costs, indirect costs, and defense costs that add up to
society's cost for cybercriminals' activities such as phishing attacks. These costs do not
just include monetary losses from the victims but also their loss of confidence in the
security mechanisms involved (Anderson et al., 2013). Cybercriminals use increasingly
ingenious schemes to take advantage of users’ judgment errors when dealing with
phishing emails and PMSER (Dhamija et al., 2006; Leontiadis et al., 2014). The main
goal of this research study is to design, develop, and validate experimental settings to
empirically test if there are significant mean differences in users' judgment when:
exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER), based
on the interaction of the kind of environment (distracting vs. non-distracting) and type of
device used (mobile phone vs. computer).

17

Chapter 2
Review of the Literature
Introduction
In this chapter, a literature review is used to provide a theoretical foundation for
this experimental research study. The literature offers a synopsis of relevant literature
related to phishing, environmental factors, and judgment errors. According to Hart
(2003), literature reviews are needed so that the researcher can gain a better
understanding of prior research on a topic to find out what has been done, what the issues
are, and how the analysis was performed. Using a concept–centric approach and quality
resources, researchers can build a solid foundation for their research (Levy & Ellis, 2006;
Webster & Watson, 2002). This literature review searched for quality peer-reviewed
journals and past research to find relevant data and findings for this research.
Phishing
Phishing scams are among the oldest and most widely used social engineering
methods to gain personal information and infiltrate organizational systems, mainly for
financial gain (Anderson et al., 2013; Marett & Wright, 2009; Moody et al., 2017).
“Social engineering consists of persuasion techniques to manipulate people into
performing actions or divulging confidential information” (Ferreira et al., 2015, p. 36).
Phishing attempts often are e-mail-based attacks but can also occur through spoofed
website links (Vishwanath et al., 2011; Zhao et al., 2017). PCs are not the only devices
susceptible to phishing; mobile phones are also targeted (Enck, 2011; Goel & Jain, 2018;
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Vidas et al., 2013). Mobile phones are rich targets for phishing attempts because users
take them everywhere with them and often store personal and financial data on them (Li
et al., 2014; Mylonas et al., 2013). These attempts are becoming more sophisticated by
using distracting features and persuasive elements (Chiew et al., 2018; Kim & Kim,
2013). The content of these messages is often disguised as legitimate companies. It
contains rational, emotional, and motivationally appealing elements that tempt users to
click on links to gain their personal information to steal their identity or financial assets
(Kim & Kim, 2013).
QR codes pose an increased risk of falling for phishing scams on mobile phones
(Dabrowski et al., 2014; Vidas et al., 2013). QR codes are subject to manipulation by
cybercriminals, directing the mobile phone to a phishing website (Mavroeidis & Nicho,
2017; Vidas et al., 2013). These QR codes use a method called Uniform Resource
Locator (URL) shorteners to hide the URL name and their identities (Dabrowski et al.,
2014; Frauenstein & Flowerday, 2016; Mavroeidis & Nicho, 2017). Cybercriminals use
this method to try and gain sensitive information from users (Focardi et al., 2018).
Cybercriminals often design phishing schemes to victimize vulnerable targets
(Zhao et al., 2017). Some users are more susceptible to phishing attacks than others
(Alarm & El-Khatib, 2016; Moody et al., 2017; Oliveira et al., 2017). Some demographic
groups, such as children, teens, and senior citizens, are more susceptible to phishing
attacks (Flores et al., 2015; Oliveira et al., 2017; Sheng et al., 2010). Users are targeted at
work and private on their computers and mobile phones to gain personal information
(Virvilis et al., 2014; Williams et al., 2018). Even with proper training, research provides
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strong evidence that users still fall victim to phishing attacks (Albladi & Weir, 2018; Kim
& Kim, 2013; Moody et al., 2017). Even corporate controls put into place for phishing
prevention often fail (McElwee et al., 2018; Silic & Back, 2016).
Table 1
Summary of Phishing Literature
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or
Construct
Phishing
websites

Dhamija et al.,
2006

Empirical
study

22 participants
were shown 20
websites

Fette et al.,
2007

Theoretical

860 phishing
emails and
6950 nonphishing emails

Phishing
emails

Moody et al.,
2007

Experimental
research

42 participants
who had been
randomly
assigned to one
of three
conditions

Phishing
education

Marett &
Wright, 2009

Experimental
research

224
undergraduate
students

Phishing

Main Finding or
Contribution
Even in the bestcase scenario, when
users expect spoofs
to be present and
are motivated to
discover them,
many cannot
distinguish a
legitimate website
from a spoofed one.
It is possible to
detect phishing
emails with high
accuracy by using a
specialized filter.
Participants with
high CRT scores
are more likely to
click on phishing
emails when they
are from an
unknown source.
There was no
systematic
difference between
the mail servers and
the unrecoverable
emails (p=.89).
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Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or
Construct
Phishing

Main Finding or
Contribution

Wright &
Marett, 2010

Empirical

446
undergraduate
students

Choo, 2011

Survey of
Australian
businesses

A random
sample of 4000
respondents

Cybercrime

Enck, 2011

Theoretical

Current mobile
phone research

Mobile
phone
security

John et al.,
2011

Theoretical

5,000 Web
domains that
attract 81000
users

Search
Engine
poisoning
attacks

Vishwanath et
al., 2011

Theoretical

161 intended
phishing
victims

Phishing

The present
research is the first
to integrate these
different streams of
research

Chin et al.,
2012

Experimental
research

60 mobile
phone users

Mobile
phone
security

Participants are
apprehensive about
running privacy-and
financially sensitive
tasks on their
phones

Four behavioral
factors were
influential as to
whether the
phishing emails
were answered with
sensitive
information.
The financial
industry was the
most targeted
industry sector in
phishing attacks in
the 2009 calendar
year
Advantages and
limitations of
existing mobile
phone protection
research.
36% of searches
yield links to
malicious pages
among their top
results.
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Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or
Construct
Cybercrime

Main Finding or
Contribution

Anderson et
al., 2013

Systemic
Study

Previous
research

Kim & Kim,
2013

Theoretical

2,068 phishing
emails

Phishing

Vidas et al.,
2013

Theoretical

225 users
scanned QR
codes in 139
locations.

Mobile
phone
security

Dabrowski et
al., 2014

Experimental
research

Ten different
2D barcode
applications for
iPhone and
Android.

Mobile
phone
security

Users with different
apps or devices
return different data
when the same
barcode is scanned.

Leontiadis et
al., 2014

Theoretical

Five million
search results
were collected
over four years

Search
Engine
poisoning
attacks

Li et al., 2014

Theoretical

1033 Chinese
youth.

Mobile
phone
security

Despite the best
efforts of search
engines to demote
low-quality content,
miscreants have
readily adapted.
There are more than
500 third-party app
stores containing
malicious apps.

Cybercrime carries
higher indirect costs
than traditional
crimes.
When messages
include quality and
supportive
arguments, they
will positively
influence attitude
change.
Of the 139 posted
flyers, 85 (61%)
were utilized by
participants to visit
the study website at
least once, totaling
225 hits across all
conditions.
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Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or
Construct
Mobile
phone
security

Main Finding or
Contribution

Virvilis et al.,
2014

Theoretical

10 mobile
phone and
desktop
browsers

Ferreira et al.,
2015

Theoretical

52 emails in the
data theft,
malware, and
fraud
categories.

Social
engineering

A reviewed list of
principles of
persuasion that
works in social
engineering

Flores et al.,
2015

Survey

2,099
Phishing
employees of
nine
organizations in
Sweden, the
USA, and India

Tsalis et al.,
2015

Experimental
research

Mobile phone
and desktop
browsers
accessing 5000
manually
verified
phishing URLs

Mobile
phone
security

Alarm & El
Katib, 2016

Theoretical

none

Phishing

Android and iOS
users are not
adequately or
sometimes not at all
protected from
phishing attacks.

Intention to resist
social engineering,
general information
security awareness,
formal IS training,
and computer
experience was
identified to
correlate to
phishing resilience
positively.
Only a subset of the
mobile browsers
supported antiphishing protection.

There is an
abundance of
identifiable
information about
individuals that is
easily accessible by
the public.
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Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or
Construct
Social
engineering

Main Finding or
Contribution

Frauenstein &
Flowerday,
2016

Theoretical

Multiple
websites and
social
networking
sites

Silic & Back,
2016

Field
experiment
and a
qualitative
study

Employees of a
Fortune 500
company
(Financial
Services)

Phishing

Experimental
research

Simulated
phishing attack
using a QR
code with
shortened URL

Mobile
phone
security

Existing
organizational SNS
policies and
procedures are
inadequate and
should be adapted
to SNS realities.
Hackers are
increasingly
leveraging QR
codes as attack
vectors putting
companies and
users at risk.

Mavroeidis &
Nicho, 2017

Moody et al.,
2017

Empirical
Research

632
undergraduate
psychology and
IS students

Phishing

Zhao et al.,
2017

Theoretical

194 participants Phishing

Chiew et al.,
2018

Survey of
phishing
mediums and
vectors

Three mediums
and eight
vectors

Phishing

Phishers are using
URL shorteners not
only to reduce
space but also to
hide their identity.

41.3% of subjects
clicked on the
enclosed links in
unsolicited emails.
Extreme phishing
attacks are highly
effective and
insidious as over
90% of the
participants became
the “victims”.
A holistic approach
is needed to
develop phishing
countermeasures.
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Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or
Construct
Mobile
phone
security

Main Finding or
Contribution

Focardi et al.,
2018

Theoretical

Previous
research

Goel & Jain,
2018

Theoretical

Current attack
techniques and
solutions for
phishing in
research

Mobile
phone
security

User education or
training is
necessary for
reducing
susceptibility to
phishing attacks.

McElwee et
al., 2018

Theoretical

Summary data
from four years
of
simulated
phishing from a
US company
with
approximately
1,000 e-mail
end-users
Study 1- 62000
employees,
Study 2 – six
focus groups

Phishing

Outcome-based
controls were not
effective in
changing end-user
susceptibility to
phishing attacks.

Williams et
al., 2018

Theoretical

Phishing

The presence of
authority cues
increased the
likelihood that a
user would click a
suspicious link in
an e-mail.

We have found that
some of the studies
and applications
developed to
protect 2D barcodes
lack essential
detailed
information.

Environment
Environmental factors affect how users perform tasks in the workplace, at home,
and in public (Dalton & Behm, 2007; Kallinen, 2004; Vredeveldt & Perfect, 2014).
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Background noise negatively affects task performance because it distracts and interrupts
users (Dalton & Behm, 2007; Larsby et al., 2008). However, the use of background
music has mixed results (Dalton & Behm, 2007; Kallinen, 2004). The use of Instant
Messaging (IM) apps in the workplace also pose a distraction in the working environment
(Garrett & Danziger, 2007; Mansi, 2011; Mansi & Levy, 2013). These distractions have a
negative effect on users’ psychological state, causing mental fatigue and reduced working
memory capacity (Conway et al., 2001; Zijlstra et al., 1999). When the working memory
is overloaded, users’ decision-making process causes judgment errors (Gómez-Chacón et
al., 2014; Speier et al., 2003).
Distracting environments can have a negative effect on working and attentional
memory (Awh & Jonides, 2001; Rodrigues & Pandeirada, 2015). Lapses of attention
caused by external distractions interrupt task performance by inhibiting working
memory’s attentive processes (Berti & Schröger, 2001; Christophel et al., 2017).
Rodrigues and Pandeirada (2015) evaluated the working memory of 40 elderly research
participants in distracting and non-distracting environments. They found that they
performed the tasks better in a non-distracting environment. The use of irrelevant stimuli
has been found to distract someone from focusing on a task by disrupting attentional
awareness (Forster & Lavie, 2008; Steinkamp, 1980; Unsworth & Robison, 2016). Many
of these irrelevant stimuli are used in phishing emails to distract the recipient away from
other details that may give away the true nature of the e-mail (Ferreira et al., 2015;
Ferreira & Teles, 2019; Pearson, 2019). These irrelevant distractors can create
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involuntary shifts in spatial attention, affecting reaction times by adding a filtering cost to
information processing (Folk & Remington, 1998, 1999).
Table 2
Summary of Environment Literature
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or
Construct
Distraction

Main Finding or
Contribution

Wright, 1974

Theoretical

210 male
undergraduates

Sanders &
Baron, 1975

Theoretical

40
undergraduate
students

Distraction

Folk &
Remington,
1999

Experimental
research

10 test
participants

Distraction

Distractors
produced
significant location
effects consistent
with attentional
capture.

Kallinen, 2004

Theoretical

30 subjects
with varying
educational
backgrounds

Background
music

Background music
listening elicited a
more immersed
user experience
(with fewer
distractions to
attention and longer
user time) than
using PDA without
listening to music.

People tend to
accentuate negative
evidence when the
environment
discourages
leisurely processing
may be indicated.
Distraction does not
necessarily impair
task performance.
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Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or
Construct
Background
noise

Main Finding or
Contribution

Dalton &
Behm, 2007

Theoretical

Prior research

Larsby et al.,
2008

Theoretical

24 subjects,
aged 56-83
years, with a
bilateral
sensorineural
hearing
impairment,
participated.

Background
noise

Noise
characteristics
affect speech
recognition
differently
depending on the
response criteria

Vredeveldt &
Perfect, 2014

Theoretical

Prior research

Environme
ntal
distraction.

Understanding the
mechanisms
involved in the
effects of
distractions on
cognitive
performance.

Rodrigues &
Pandeirada,
2015

Experimental
research

40 elderly
participants

Environme
ntal
distraction

The results revealed
better performance
in the attentional
tasks when these
were done in the
non-distracting
environment

Acute and
continuous noise
adversely affects
vigilance and
comprehension.

Judgment Errors
Many researchers have studied the reasons that humans make choices when faced
with decisions, often under uncertain terms (Fox & Tversky, 1998; Kahneman &
Tversky, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Some of these choices are reason-based,
belief-based, and involve bias (Ayton & Pascoe, 1995; Fox & Tversky, 1998; Shafir et

28

al., 1993). Human error has been researched for decades by several researchers that have
made extensive contributions to the field. (Cohen, 1981; Reason, 1990; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974, 1983). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) began researching human
judgment when presented with uncertain choices. In the process of their research, they
developed System 1 (intuitive) and 2 (analytical) thinking in the decision-making process
(Tay et al., 2016; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). System 1 and System 2 thinking work
hand in hand with human judgment, with analytical thinking confirming or overriding
intuitive thinking (Evans, 2003; Frankish, 2010). Judgments are often made from
multiple cues provided by the information being processed. However, these judgments
can be affected by subconscious cognitive biases (Evans, 2003, 2008; Evans et al., 2003;
Fisk, 2002).
Reason (1990) viewed human error as failures of execution broken down into
slips and lapses. Slips are attention-based, whereas lapses are memory-based failures
often occurring when performing routine tasks (Flehmig et al., 2007; Norman, 1981;
Reason, 1995a; Reason, 1984). Slips in judgment can be caused by external
environmental factors or distractions (Flehmig et al., 2007). Lapses in attention can
reduce reaction times and inhibit the completion of tasks (Weissman et al., 2006). Lapses
also can impair one’s ability to minimize distractions in the environment (Weissman et
al., 2006).
Users are subjected to various distractions when interacting with mobile phones
and computers; often, these distractions cause errors in judgment (Ayton & Pascoe, 1995;
Chowdhury, 2016; Funder, 1987). Mobile phones cause many distractions by inhibiting
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users’ working memory (Nicholson et al., 2005). Many users do not understand the risks
of using computers and mobile phones (Schneier & West, 2008). Security tends only to
be a low priority for users unless a problem arises (Schneier & West, 2008). Security is a
low priority because users do not fully understand the losses that can be involved
(Schneier & West, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).
Users will often develop anxiety and coping mechanisms when dealing with
potential phishing scams (Wang et al., 2017; Wright, 1974). Distracted users often have a
hard time detecting the elements of phishing emails leading to potential judgment errors
(Furnell, 2007; Karakasiliotis et al., 2006). Many users judge visual and technical cues in
phishing emails and will often not be able to detect phishing attempts (Karakasiliotis et
al., 2006). Habitually reading emails while distracted by various environmental factors
can increase users’ susceptibility to phishing scams (Vishwanath et al., 2011). Errors of
judgment often have real consequences involved, depending on the context (Chowdhury,
2016; Funder, 1987).
Table 3
Summary of Judgment Errors Literature
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument or
Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Wright, 1974

Theoretical

210 male
undergraduates

Distraction

People tend to
accentuate
negative evidence
when the
environment
discourages
leisurely
processing may be
indicated.
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Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument or
Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Norman, 1981

Theoretical

None

Slip
Categorized slips
categorization into three major
categories and
many
subcategories.

Tverski &
Kahneman,
1983

Theoretical

Two groups of
students, N=
105 and 102

Probability
Judgment

The numerous
conjunction errors
illustrate people’s
affinity for
nonextensional
reasoning.

Funder, 1987

Theoretical

Two samples
N= 37 and 69

Judgment
errors

Kahneman &
Tverski, 1996

Theoretical

Three groups
of students N=
36,33, and 31.

Cognitive
awareness

Lampel &
Shapira, 2001

Theoretical

None

Judgment
errors

Although errors
can be highly
informative about
judgment, they are
not necessarily
relevant to the
content.
Subjects use
representativeness
to estimate
outcome
frequencies and
edit their responses
to obey class
inclusion in the
presence of solid
extensional cues.
Context influences
judgment.
Judgmental errors
cause
misinterpretation
of evidence and a
consequent sense
of false security.
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Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument or
Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Nicholson et
al., 2005

Theoretical

48 subjects

Distraction Conflict
theory

Karakasiliotis
et al., 2006

Experimental
research

179
participants

Social
engineering

Tasks requiring a
higher amount of
cognitive effort in
environments with
moderate to
elevated levels of
distractions may
impair an
individual’s
performance.
179 participants
were 36%
successful in
identifying
legitimate emails
versus 45%
illegitimate ones.

Weissman et
al., 2006

Experimental
research

16 participants

Region of
Lapses impair
Interest (ROI) goal-directed
analyses
behavior.

Flehmig et al.,
2007

Survey

222
participants

Neuroticism
and cognitive
failure
liability

Furnell, 2007

Theoretical

179
participants

Phishing

Schneier &
West, 2008

Theoretical

Prior research

Decision
making

Positive
correlations
between N and
general cognitive
failure liability.
People have
significant
problems in
discriminating
between messages
based on the
content alone.
Security only
becomes a priority
for many when
they have
problems with it.
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Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument or
Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Vishwanath et
al., 2011

Theoretical

161 e-mail
users at a
major
university in
the northeast
USA

Phishing

Chowdhury,
2016

Theoretical

20 mid and
top-level
managers from
10 large
apparel
manufacturing
factories

Judgment
errors

Tay et al.,
2016

Experimental
research

128 medical
students

Decision
Making

Wang et al.,
2016

Survey

547 US
consumers

Phishing

Habitual media use
patterns combined
with high e-mail
load levels
significantly
influence
individuals’
likelihood of being
phished.
The respondents
also have different
interpretations of
the term “error of
Judgment” and
“white-collar
crime” are
associated with
OHS negligence
and evasion.
Up to half of the
medical students
demonstrated
complete or partial
reliance on System
1 (intuitive)
thinking
Coping
adaptiveness was
driven by a
perceived threat,
efficacy, and
phishing anxiety,
determining
detection effort
and accuracy.
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Summary of What is Known and Unknown
With the presence of increasingly ingenious phishing schemes looking to steal
identities and information for financial gain, it has become essential for organizations and
government agencies to increase their users’ awareness. Social engineering has become
increasingly easier for cybercriminals with the added distraction of mobile phones in
users’ hands. Cyberslacking and environmental distractions such as conversations or
background noise affect users’ cognitive performance, sometimes negatively (Alharthi et
al., 2019; Hernández et al., 2016). User distraction can negatively affect their ability to
judge phishing schemes’ validity in emails or malicious search engine links. Distracted
users will often miss the phishing scheme’s cues leading to stolen identities or financial
losses for them and their organizations (Williams et al., 2018). Demographic factors such
as age, gender, education, and social media usage level determine the likelihood of a user
making a judgment error when dealing with phishing schemes (Gratian et al., 2018;
Oliveira et al., 2017; Sheng et al., 2010). Security awareness training plays a decisive role
in defending from phishing attacks; however, it is not entirely successful (Goode, 2018;
Musuva et al., 2019; Rocha Flores & Ekstedt, 2016).
Judgment errors can occur in many different ways when distractions overload a
person’s cognitive processes. An overloaded cognitive process is a slow reaction and
negatively affects spatial awareness when performing tasks. Slips or Lapses in attention
can inhibit task performance and lead to errors in judgment when users are in distracting
environments (Reason, 1984). System 1 and System 2 thinking helps users with cue
processing in the performance of tasks. These processes can get interrupted by
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environmental distractions leading to errors in judgment (Kahneman & Tversky, 1983;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Irrelevant stimuli can distract users from the visual cues
that are used to detect phishing emails or PMSER links. This stimulus can affect a user’s
spatial awareness, leading to a successful phishing attempt.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
Overview of Research Design
This study is an experimental field research. This phase of the study documents
the expert panel phases conducted with SMEs to validate the set of experiments before
moving to the subsequent phases of the study. The expert panel research design process’s
model is based on the work of Tracey and Richey (2007), which uses the Delphi
technique that uses a panel of SME analysis and feedback (See Figure 1). The Delphi
technique is an essential methodology in situations where accurate information is not
available and expert judgment is needed (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014).
To protect the validity of the experimental study, the research participants were
informed of the significance of social engineering attacks, including phishing and
PMSER. Along with the fact that they were asked to distinguish between valid and nonvalid phishing examples and PMSER, but will not be informed on the exact comparisons
of the environment type and device type (Finn & Jakobsson, 2007; Parsons et al., 2015).
Parsons et al. (2015) found that when participants were informed of the phishing
experiment’s nature, they had a significant discrimination rate over the participants that
were not told. The Delphi technique is an essential methodology in situations where
accurate information is not available and expert judgment is needed (Ramim & Lichvar,
2014). The SME panel will determine if the two sets of tasks and eight experimental
protocols meet understandability, answerability, and readability standards (Ramim &
Lichvar, 2014). Figure 2 illustrates the research design that this study will follow.
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Figure 2
Overview of the Research Design Process
Inputs, Results, and
Contributions
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Experimental
Research Design

Phase 1

Formulation or
Research Questions

Phase 1 of this experimental research study will utilize an SME-review process
following the Delphi technique, along with prior research to design and validate the
SMEs’ identified two sets of tasks and eight experimental protocols to assess users’
judgment when exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing &
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PMSER). Phase 2 of this study will employ pilot testing of the SMEs’ identified two sets
of experimental tasks and eight experimental protocols to assess users’ judgment when
exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER), two
types of environments (distracting vs. non-distracting) and two types of devices used
(mobile phone vs. computer). About 10 users were recruited for the pilot test of the SME
validated two sets of experimental tasks and eight experimental protocols to make any
needed adjustments. Finally, Phase 3 of this study was used to collect and analyze the
experimental data from 50 users to find if any significant mean differences exist in users’
judgment when exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing &
PMSER).
Experimental Tasks and Measures
The first draft of the two sets of experimental tasks and eight experimental
protocols were developed by exploring current literature from empirical research
databases from varying fields of study such as IS, Cybersecurity, Psychology, and
Finance. Phishing IQ and PMSER IQ tests, as shown in Table 5, were developed based
on previous research to include a mixture of phishing emails and potentially malicious
and legitimate SE links.
The administrative approach of the two sets of experimental tasks and eight
experimental protocols were collected via e-mail using web-based Google forms based
on a scoring scale for the SME’s Delphi rounds. The SME input from each round was
recorded, and changes to the experimental tasks and protocols were made based on the
weight of the feedback based on the scale before the next round. The two sets of
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experimental tasks and eight experimental protocols for this research study (Figure 3)
were validated using the Delphi methodology by recruiting SMEs from the field of
cybersecurity.

Figure 3
2x2x2 Experimental Design Taxonomy of Device (Mobile Phone/Computer) vs.
Environment (Distracting/Non-Distracting) vs. Social Engineering Attack Type
(Phishing/PMSER) with Experimental Tasks and Protocols

The Delphi methodology involves a group communications process involving
SMEs to provide SME feedback on a specific subject (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). This
research study conducted rounds of SME elicitations to ensure consensus while
developing a) SMEs identified two sets of validated experimental tasks that need to be
measured, and b) SMEs identified eight experimental protocols. The SME Delphi rounds
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were used to develop two sets of experimental tasks (Figure 4) to measure users’
judgment when exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing &
PMSER). These two experimental tasks were based on SMEs identified eight
experimental protocols to assess the measures of users’ judgment when exposed to two
types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER) during two types of
environments (distracting vs. non-distracting) and two types of devices (mobile phone vs.
computer).
Figure 4
Two Sets of Experimental Tasks for the Measures of Users’ Judgment When Exposed to
Two Types of Simulated Social Engineering Attacks (Phishing & PMSER).

Phishing
and
PMSER
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Tests

Yes

Data
Collection

Judgement Error
Count

Are There
Judgement
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Non-Judgment Error
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Recording

No
Phishing
and
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Figures 5 and 6 detail a sample of the two experimental tasks and the eight
experimental protocols presented to the SMEs for validation. The SMEs provided
feedback on each question, and the highest weighted question among the feedback was
chosen. An additional round may be necessary if the scores are tied for some questions or
better suggestions are made that need to be voted on. RQ1 and RQ2 will collect the SME
validation for the two experimental tasks and the eight experimental protocols. RQ3 and
RQ4 will analyze the phishing and PMSER Pilot testing and experimental testing data
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using a two-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). RQ5 and RQ6 will analyze the
phishing and PMSER pilot and experimental testing data using a two-way Analysis of
Covariance (ANCOVA).
Figure 5
Sample SME Survey of the Physical Environment Distractions
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Figure 6
Sample SME Survey of the Audio/Visual Distraction Levels

Validity and Reliability
Internal validity “encompasses whether the study results are legitimate because of
the way the groups were selected, data was recorded or analysis performed” (Lakshmi &
Mohideen, 2013, p. 2752). This research study utilized the Delphi methodology during
the development of the testing instrument to control known sources of error that will
affect the validity of the testing (Barchard & Pace, 2011; Kimberlin & Winterstein,
2008). The Delphi technique is used in research studies because the processes involved
provide the study’s validity (Kennedy, 2004; Lempinen et al., 2012; Straub & Gefen,
2004). The Delphi technique consists of several rounds of iterations to help control the
design process and ensure the validity of all constructs (Hasson et al., 2000; Lempinen et
al., 2012). The strength in numbers approaches offered by the Delphi technique helps to
support the validity of the research methods when using knowledgeable participants in
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the form of SMEs (Hasson et al., 2000; Worrell et al., 2013). SMEs add valuable
knowledge to the Delphi technique in the form of concurrent validity, which strengthens
the research (Powell, 2003; Williams & Webb, 1994).
Reliability ensures consistent results are produced and makes “a statement about
measurement accuracy” (Straub & Gefen, 2004, p. 400). Eliciting SMEs’ feedback will
help ensure validity and reliability when developing measures for this research (Brown et
al., 2015). Reliability and validity work hand in hand to ensure research accuracy
(Creswell, 2013; Straub & Gefen, 2004). To ensure the validity and reliability of the
SMEs’ validated two experimental tasks and eight experimental protocols, the questions
for each mini phishing and PMSER IQ test were randomized into groups of three
questions based on SME feedback. As shown in Table 4 and Figure 3, these groupings
are broken down into legitimate, easy, medium, and hard questions for phishing and
PMSER. Each group is separated into distracting and non-distracting testing
environments for mobile phones and computers. The SMEs were asked to evaluate the
randomization table and provide feedback on how to properly randomize each group’s
questions to maintain the reliability of the two experimental tasks and eight experimental
protocols.
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Table 4
Phishing and PMSER Mini IQ Test Randomization Table
Test Type

Phishing
Mini IQ
Phishing
Mini IQ
Phishing
Mini IQ
PMSER
Mini IQ
PMSER
Mini IQ
PMSER
Mini IQ

Group 1
Mobile Phone/
Non-Distracting
Legitimate

Group 2
Mobile Phone/
Distracting
Phishing Hard

Phishing Easy

Legitimate

Group 3
Computer/ NonDistracting
Phishing
Medium
Phishing Hard

Phishing Medium

Phishing Easy

Legitimate

PMSER Easy

Legitimate

PMSER Hard

PMSER Medium

PMSER Easy

Legitimate

Group 4
Computer/
Distracting
Phishing
Easy
Phishing
Medium
Phishing
Hard
PMSER
Medium
PMSER Hard

PMSER Hard

PMSER
Medium

PMSER Easy

Legitimate

Having a large group of SMEs in a research study using the Delphi technique
helps increase the study’s reliability (Ono & Wedemeyer, 1994; Powell, 2003). A
significant advantage of using the Delphi technique is that it leverages the SMEs’
collective wisdom without the group setting’s confrontational pressure. (Okoli &
Pawlowski, 2004; Skinner et al., 2015). Therefore, this study will collect data from at
least 25 SMEs and incorporate their input into the mini phishing and PMSER IQ tests to
ensure the validity of the two sets of experimental tasks and eight experimental protocols.

SME Data and Analysis
A sample size of 25 cybersecurity SMEs for the Delphi rounds was recruited via
e-mail and a LinkedIn recruitment post to get a larger sample size. To reach the desired
sample size, up to 40 SMEs were recruited. SMEs were from the cybersecurity field in

44

industry and academia to provide a better diversity of skills and experience following the
recommendation of Kennedy (2004) and Ramim and Lichvar (2014). The recruited SMEs
provided input for the experimental research design process, as shown in Figure 2, the
physical environment distractions in Figure 5, and audio/visual distraction levels in
Figure 6.
This research study addressed RQ1 by using the Delphi methodology to identify
and validate the specific SMEs’ two sets of experimental tasks to assess users’ judgment
when exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER)
during two types of environments (distracting vs. non-distracting), and two types of
devices (mobile phone vs. computer). The Delphi methodology was also used to address
RQ2 by validating the specific SMEs identified eight experimental protocols to assess the
measures of users’ judgment when exposed to two types of simulated social engineering
attacks (phishing & PMSER) during two types of environments (distracting vs. nondistracting), and two types of devices (mobile phone vs. computer).
Table 5
Phishing and PMSER IQ Test Constructs and Measures used in Experimental Research
Study
IQ Test
Number

IQ Test
Type

IQ Test Topic

Simulation
Type

PH-IQ01

Phishing

E-mail from the FBI about a
banking transaction.

Phishing
Easy

PH-IQ02

Phishing

E-mail alert from Microsoft
about login activity on
account.

Phishing
Medium

IQ Test Scale
Legitimate,
Phishing, or Ask IT
Department
Legitimate,
Phishing, or Ask IT
Department

45

IQ Test
Number

IQ Test
Type

IQ Test Topic

Simulation
Type

PH-IQ03

Phishing

E-mail alert from Experian
about a change to a credit
report.

Legitimate

PH-IQ04

Phishing

E-mail alert from NETFLIX
about account cancellation.

Phishing
Medium

PH-IQ05

Phishing

Phishing
Hard

PH-IQ06

Phishing

PH-IQ07

Phishing

Reminder e-mail from
PayPal about security
upgrades to their system.
E-mail from Audible about
a free audiobook service for
kids.
E-mail alert from Google
showing a new sign-in to
account.
E-mail alert from Citibank
stating that the account was
locked out due to three
failed login attempts.
Payment receipt from
MCPROHOSTING for
server space rental.
E-mail alert from Amazon
regarding an item selling
through their website.
E-mail advertisement asking
the user to view travel offers
for the state of Wisconsin.
E-mail alert from Cisco
WebEx asking the user to
update to an updated
version of WebEx.

PH-IQ08

Phishing

PH-IQ09

Phishing

PH-IQ10

Phishing

PH-IQ11

Phishing

PH-IQ12

Phishing

Legitimate
Phishing
Medium
Phishing
Easy

Legitimate
Phishing
Easy
Phishing
Hard

IQ Test Scale
Legitimate,
Phishing, or Ask IT
Department
Legitimate,
Phishing, or Ask IT
Department
Legitimate,
Phishing, or Ask IT
Department
Legitimate,
Phishing, or Ask IT
Department
Legitimate,
Phishing, or Ask IT
Department
Legitimate,
Phishing, or Ask IT
Department
Legitimate,
Phishing, or Ask IT
Department
Legitimate e-mail,
Phishing e-mail, or
Ask IT Department
Legitimate e-mail,
Phishing e-mail, or
Ask IT Department

Phishing
Hard

Legitimate,
Phishing, or Ask IT
Department

PMSER
Easy

Legitimate,
Possibility
Malicious, or Ask IT
Department

PM-IQ01

PMSER

Search for Motillum using a
search engine browser.

PM-IQ02

PMSER

Search for tickets for the
PMSER
2010 Miss Universe pageant Medium

Legitimate,
Possibility
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IQ Test
Number

IQ Test
Type

IQ Test Topic

Simulation
Type

using a search engine
browser.

Malicious, or Ask IT
Department

PMSER

Search for the term
blockchain using a search
engine browser.

PMSER
Hard

PMSER

Search for hotels for an
upcoming trip to Berlin,
Germany using a search
engine browser.

PMSER
Hard

PM-IQ05

PMSER

Search for killer whales at
SeaWorld using a search
engine browser.

PMSER
Easy

PM-IQ06

PMSER

Search for the malwaretips
website using a search
engine browser.

PMSER
Medium

PM-IQ07

PMSER

Search for camping gear
using a search engine
browser.

PMSER
Medium

PM-IQ08

PMSER

Searched for the 2018
midterm elections using a
search engine browser

PMSER
Easy

PM-IQ09

PMSER

Search for COVID-19 using
a search engine browser.

Legitimate

PM-IQ10

PMSER

Search for the RuneScape
download website using a
search engine browser.

Legitimate

PM-IQ11

PMSER

Search for the NFL tickets
using a search engine
browser.

Legitimate

PM-IQ03

PM-IQ04

IQ Test Scale

Legitimate,
Possibility
Malicious, or Ask IT
Department
Legitimate,
Possibility
Malicious, or Ask IT
Department
Legitimate,
Possibility
Malicious, or Ask IT
Department
Legitimate,
Possibility
Malicious, or Ask IT
Department
Legitimate,
Possibility
Malicious, or Ask IT
Department
Legitimate,
Possibility
Malicious, or Ask IT
Department
Legitimate,
Possibility
Malicious, or Ask IT
Department
Legitimate,
Possibility
Malicious, or Ask IT
Department
Legitimate,
Possibility
Malicious, or Ask IT
Department
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IQ Test
Number
PM-IQ12

IQ Test
Type

IQ Test Topic

Simulation
Type

IQ Test Scale

PMSER

Search for information
about the drug Procentra
using a search engine
browser.

PMSER
Hard

Legitimate,
Possibility
Malicious, or Ask IT
Department

The SMEs were given a four-part survey to provide feedback during the Delphi
rounds. The first part provided a brief demographic background to ensure that they are
cybersecurity professionals, as shown in Appendix D. The second part will consist of
questions based on Figure 5 and Figure 6, based on the physical environment and AV
distraction levels in Figure 7. Part three of the SME survey will contain a 12-question
sample phishing e-mail IQ test, based on Table 5 and Appendix I. SMEs were asked their
opinion of the sample of the emails, as shown in Figure 8, on whether to (a) keep; (b)
revise; (c) replace each sample. Options B and C will have a section for SME comments
on why they chose to revise or replace each sample. Part four of the survey will contain a
12-question sample PMSER IQ test, based on Table 5 and Appendix I. SMEs were asked
their opinion of the sample of the SERs on whether to (a) keep; (b) revise; (c) replace
each sample. As noted earlier, the revise and replace options will have an option for SME
feedback to improve the process.
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Figure 7
Environment Possibilities for Location and AV Distraction Levels for SMEs Survey

The data collected from the SME surveys were used to create eight mini-IQ tests
based on the: environment and device type. These IQ tests are based on prior literature
and industry tests. After the SME survey, an application delivery system was developed
to collect quantitative and qualitative data from the research participants. Once the miniIQ test was developed based on the SME's feedback in Phase 1, a pilot test was
conducted with 10 participants to determine if any adjustments needed to be made to this
research study's testing, data collection, and data analysis.
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Figure 8
Sample Email Question for the SMEs Survey.

Sample
The sample size for the pilot testing phase of this experimental research study was
ten users recruited from a regional Virginia Community College staff and student
population. These users were chosen based on age, gender, education, and computer
experience levels to check for errors in the pilot testing process.
The sample size for this experimental research study included 68 users from
varying demographic backgrounds (Boudreau et al., 2001, p. 5). The participants of this
research study were recruited from all the regional Virginia Community College
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campuses through flyers posted on bulletin boards in the communal areas and through
campus e-mail. The student population has a diverse enrollment in terms of age, gender,
education, and computer experience levels. Faculty and staff members were also included
to help even out the numbers for age groups and add more diversity to the education
levels. The likely ages of participants were also between 18 and 70 years of age, with the
age groups broken down into generational groups according to sample size.
Pre-Analysis Data Screening
Pre-analysis data screening is used to “detect irregularities or problems with the
collected data” (Levy, 2006, p. 150). Missing data must be evaluated before the final
analysis to ensure consistency, validity, and reliability (Levy, 2006; Onwuegbuzie et al.,
2010). For reporting accuracy, it is essential to correct any data entry errors. The visual
checking or double entry methods can ensure no discrepancies between the testing data
and what is entered into the statistical software (Barchard & Pace, 2011). The visual
checking method involves a single-entry method in which each entry is verified visually
from the test results as it is being entered. The double-entry method involves entering the
test results twice and having software detect any discrepancies.
In order to correct any potential data entry errors, statistical methods such as
correlation, frequency distributions, and simple and cross variable checking can be used
to detect possible outliers that can skew the data (Barchard & Pace, 2011; Mavridis &
Moustaki, 2008; Wilcox, 1998; Yuan & Zhong, 2008). Any out-of-range values can then
be identified and corrected by statistical means such as histograms, frequency tables, and
a Bonferroni correction (Barchard & Pace, 2011; Li et al., 2015). Any incomplete or
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missing data is generally discarded by a majority of multivariate statistics algorithms,
which can lead to skewed results due to overlooked data (Raymond & Roberts, 1987).
Other methods that use mathematical comparisons or machine learning techniques are
also available options when dealing with incomplete data (Aste et al., 2014; Van Der
Palm et al., 2012). For this research study, every effort was made to ensure that the data
entered was correct by double-checking every entry and not including any incomplete or
missing data entries to prevent skewing the results by adding outliers.
Data Analysis
Figure 2 outlines the three phases of the data collection process for this research
study. Phase 1 of this experimental research study collected data from 25 SME surveys
from the Google forms spreadsheet. This SME data was sorted based on the SME
demographics data, shown in Appendix D, and the scores provided on their responses, as
shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6. The highest score was used to select the two
experimental tasks and eight experimental protocols used for data collection for Phase 2
and Phase 3 testing for the experimental research participants.
Phase 2 of this experimental research study collected data from a ten experimental
user pilot test of the SMEs validated two experimental tasks and eight experimental
protocols following the methods, as shown in Figure 2. Figure 4 outlines the flow of the
data collection methods of the two experimental tasks and eight experimental protocols
for Phase 2 and Phase 3 of this experimental research. The data collected in Phase 2 was
used to adjust the two SMEs-validated experimental tasks and the eight validated
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experimental protocols. These adjustments were based on errors produced in the
administration and data analysis procedures.
Phase 3 of this experimental research study will collect data from the adjusted
experimental tasks and protocols shown in Figure 2. This data was processed using the
methods shown in Figure 2, Figure 4, and Figure 9. Figures 2 and 4 show the data flow
methods for administering, collecting, and analyzing the experimental data for the two
experimental tasks and eight experimental protocols. Figure 4 shows the data analysis
methods used in all three phases of this experimental research study.
Three types of analysis were conducted to assess the six research questions, as
shown in Figure 10: The Delphi methodology, two-way ANOVA, and two-way
ANCOVA. An initial proposal of two sets of experimental tasks and eight experimental
protocols were developed from the literature exploration and submitted to the SMEs for
validation. Appendices H, I, and J contain sample questions used to collect data from the
research participants. Appendix G contains basic demographic questions, Appendix H
contains Phishing IQ questions, and Appendix I contains PMSER IQ questions. The
demographic data from Appendix G separated the IQ questions from Appendices H and I
into distinct categories for statistical analysis.
This research study addressed RQ1 by using the Delphi methodology to identify
and validate the specific SMEs’ two sets of experimental tasks to assess users’ judgment
when exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER)
during two types of environments (distracting vs. non-distracting), and two types of
devices (mobile phone vs. computer). The Delphi methodology was also used to address
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RQ2 by validating the specific SMEs identified eight experimental protocols to assess the
measures of users’ judgment when exposed to two types of simulated social engineering
attacks (phishing & PMSER) during two types of environments (distracting vs. nondistracting), and two types of devices (mobile phone vs. computer).
Figure 9
Research Questions and Methodology
RQ
RQ1
RQ2
RQ3

RQ4

RQ5

RQ6

Description
SMEs identified two sets of validated experimental tasks to
assess users’ judgment
What are the specific SMEs identified eight experimental
protocols to assess the measures of users’ judgment
Significant mean differences in users’ judgment when
exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks
(phishing & PMSER) in distracting vs. non-distracting
environments.
Significant mean differences in users’ judgment when
exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks
(phishing & PMSER) when using a mobile phone vs. a
computer.
Statistically, significant mean differences in users’ judgment
when exposed to two types of simulated social engineering
attacks (phishing & PMSER), based on the interaction of the
kind of environment (distracting vs. non-distracting) and type
of device used (mobile phone vs. computer).
Significant mean differences in users’ judgment when
exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks
(phishing & PMSER) when controlled for the users’: (a) age,
(b) gender, (c) education, and (d) level of social media usage

Methodology
Delphi
Delphi
Two-way
ANOVA

Two-way
ANOVA

Two-way
ANOVA

Two-way
ANCOVA

To address RQ3, a two-way ANOVA was conducted to see any statistically
significant mean differences in users’ judgment when: exposed to two types of simulated
social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER). A two-way ANOVA also addressed
RQ4 to determine if there are any significant mean differences in users’ judgment when
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exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER) when
using a mobile phone vs. a computer. A two-way ANOVA was also used to address RQ5
to determine if there were any significant mean differences in users’ judgment when
exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER), based
on the interaction of the types of environment (distracting vs. non-distracting) and type of
device used (mobile phone vs. computer. A two-way ANCOVA was used to answer RQ6
to determine if there are any significant mean differences in users’ judgment when
exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER) when
controlled for the users’: (a) age, (b) gender, (c) education, and (d) level of social media
usage.
Resources
IRB approval was needed to collaborate with human subjects. Access to
cybersecurity SMEs for following the Delphi technique SME panel process and research
SMEs for developing the four experimental protocols. A Windows laptop or MacBook
was provided for two protocols to access the four experimental protocols. A mobile
device was provided for the other two protocols. The experimental protocols were
administered in random order through a Google forms page for each protocol in the form
of a phishing IQ test. A statistical tool was utilized following data collection to analyze
the results.
Summary
Chapter Three included a description of the research design and methodology for
this research study. This experimental research will use a combination of a Delphi

55

methodology and ANOVA and ANCOVA statistics. Phase 1 of this experimental
research study will utilize an SME-review process following the Delphi technique. Along
with prior research to design and validate, the SMEs’ identified two sets of tasks and
eight experimental protocols that need to be measured to assess users’ judgment when
exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER). Phase
2 will employ pilot testing of the SMEs’ identified two sets of experimental tasks and
eight experimental protocols to assess users’ judgment when exposed to two types of
simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER), two types of environments
(distracting vs. non-distracting), and two types of devices used (mobile phone vs.
computer). 10 users were recruited for the pilot test of the SME validated two
experimental tasks and eight experimental protocols to make any needed adjustments.
Finally, Phase 3 of this study was used to collect and analyze the experimental data from
50 users to find if any significant mean differences exist in users’ judgment when
exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER). Phase
3 included the research study conclusion and recommendations.

56

Chapter 4
Results
Overview
This chapter presents the data collection and analysis results from this research study.
The main goal was to design, develop, and validate experimental settings to empirically test if
there are significant mean differences in users’ judgment when: exposed to two types of
simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER), based on the interaction of the kind
of environment (distracting vs. non-distracting) and type of device used (mobile phone vs.
computer).
Phase I – SME Survey Feedback and Findings
RQ1and RQ2 were answered through a survey instrument during the first phase of this
research study. Invitation emails to participate in the Subject Matter Expert (SME) survey was sent
to about 60 cybersecurity experts and a social media post on LinkedIn with a goal of 25
respondents. An SME panel of 28 cybersecurity experts participated in this Delphi study, and a
consensus was met on the survey questions. Table 6 provides the descriptive statistics of the 28
respondents during the SME responses from March to May of 2021. The cybersecurity experts
ranged from cybersecurity practitioners including network security engineers, Information
Technology (IT) security analysts, information security managers, information technology
auditors, cybersecurity administrators, cybersecurity consultants, cybersecurity architects, and
senior IT executives.
Additionally, professors and researchers in cybersecurity were among the participants.
Over 57.1% of the respondents had over 10 years of experience in cybersecurity or information
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security, followed by 25% with five to 10 years of cybersecurity or information security
experience. The rest fell into the five years or less category. While most of the cybersecurity SMEs
in senior positions previously worked in various positions in cybersecurity, the SMEs were limited
to only entering one current profession for the survey.
Table 6
Descriptive Statistics of SMEs (N=28)
Survey Question
Frequency Percentage
Professional role:
Network Security or Cybersecurity Engineer
3
10.7%
Cybersecurity, Information Security, or Information Technology
8
28.6%
Security Analyst
Information Security Manager
3
10.7%
Information Technology Auditor
1
3.6%
Cybersecurity Administrator
0
0%
Cybersecurity Consultant
0
0%
Cybersecurity Architect
0
0%
Other
10
35.7%
Experience in Information Security:
10 years or more
16
57.1%
At least five years, but less than 10 years
7
25%
At least three years, but less than five years
2
7.1%
At least one year, but less than three years
1
3.6%
Less than one year
1
3.6%
No Experience
1
3.6%
Number of cybersecurity certifications:
None
15
53.6%
One
4
14.3%
Two
4
14.3%
Three
2
7.1%
Four or more
3
10.7%

As shown in Appendix H, the SMEs were asked to evaluate 12 sample emails for use in
the mini-IQ tests for the experimental research. They were asked to evaluate each email sample
and answer, as shown in Table 7, if the email sample was legitimate, phishing, or unsure. The
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sample emails were a mixture of legitimate and various difficulty levels for the phishing emails
(easy, medium, and hard). As indicated in Table 7, some email samples had a higher level of unsure
responses as the difficulty increased.
Table 7
SME Feedback on Email Samples for IQ Testing (N=28)
Email Phishing Sample
Please identify the sample email above as one of the following:
Legitimate, Phishing, or Unsure
Sample 1
Legitimate
Phishing
Unsure
Sample 2
Legitimate
Phishing
Unsure
Sample 3
Legitimate
Phishing
Unsure
Sample 4
Legitimate
Phishing
Unsure
Sample 5
Legitimate
Phishing
Unsure
Sample 6
Legitimate
Phishing
Unsure
Sample 7
Legitimate
Phishing
Unsure
Sample 8
Legitimate
Phishing

Frequency Percentage

1
27
0

3.6%
96.4%
0%

13
12
3

46.4%
42.9%
10.7%

10
4
14

35.7%
14.3%
50%

1
24
3

3.6%
85.7%
10.7%

2
24
2

7.1%
85.7%
7.1%

18
3
7

64.3%
10.7%
25%

17
6
5

60.7%
21.4%
17.9%

8
18

28.6%
64.3%
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Email Phishing Sample
Unsure
Sample 9
Legitimate
Phishing
Unsure
Sample 10
Legitimate
Phishing
Unsure
Sample 11
Legitimate
Phishing
Unsure
Sample 12
Legitimate
Phishing
Unsure

Frequency Percentage
2
7.1%
9
7
12

32.1%
25%
42.9%

0
28
0

0%
100%
0%

6
16
6

21.4%
57.1%
21.4%

5
18
5

17.9%
64.3%
17.9%

The SMEs were also asked to provide feedback on whether to keep, revise, or replace the
sample emails they evaluated from Table 7. As shown in Table 8, most SMEs chose to keep all
the email samples. The SMEs were also asked to provide feedback on why they chose the revise
or replace options and any additional feedback that might improve the email samples. Some vital
feedback on the revisions came from the over 60 age group on adjusting the image quality on two
samples to be more readable for all participants.
Table 8
SME Feedback on Email Sample Edits (N=28)
Email Phishing Sample
Please provide your expert opinion about the email sample above by
indicating: Keep, Revise, or Replace
Sample 1
Keep
Revise
Replace

Frequency Percentage

21
6
1

75%
21.4%
3.6%

60

Email Phishing Sample
Sample 2
Keep
Revise
Replace
Sample 3
Keep
Revise
Replace
Sample 4
Keep
Revise
Replace
Sample 5
Keep
Revise
Replace
Sample 6
Keep
Revise
Replace
Sample 7
Keep
Revise
Replace
Sample 8
Keep
Revise
Replace
Sample 9
Keep
Revise
Replace
Sample 10
Keep
Revise
Replace
Sample 11
Keep
Revise
Replace

Frequency Percentage
23
2
3

82.1%
7.1%
10.7%

20
7
1

71.4%
25%
3.6%

25
1
2

89.3%
3.6%
7.1%

22
3
3

78.6%
10.7%
10.7%

25
2
1

89.3%
7.1%
3.6%

22
5
1

78.6%
17.9%
3.6%

21
6
1

75%
21.4%
3.6%

14
8
6

50%
28.6%
21.4%

26
1
1

92.9%
3.6%
3.6%

23
2
3

82.1%
7.1%
10.7%
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Email Phishing Sample
Sample 12
Keep
Revise
Replace

Frequency Percentage
26
1
1

92.9%
3.6%
3.6%

The SMEs were asked to evaluate 12 PMSER samples as shown in Appendix I for future
experimental research use in the mini-IQ tests. They were asked to evaluate whether each email
sample and answer, as shown in Table 9, was whether the PMSER was legitimate, potentially
malicious, or unsure. The PMSER samples were a mixture of legitimate and various difficulty
levels for the PMSER samples (easy, medium, and hard).
Table 9
SME Feedback on PMSER Samples for IQ Testing (N=28)
PMSER Sample
Please identify the sample PMSER above as one of the following:
Legitimate, Potentially Malicious, or Unsure
Sample 1
Legitimate
Potentially Malicious
Unsure
Sample 2
Legitimate
Potentially Malicious
Unsure
Sample 3
Legitimate
Potentially Malicious
Unsure
Sample 4
Legitimate
Potentially Malicious
Unsure
Sample 5
Legitimate
Potentially Malicious

Frequency Percentage

3
22
3

10.7%
78.6%
2.7%

13
12
3

36.4%
42.9%
10.7%

8
14
6

28.6%
50%
21.4%

21
5
2

75%
17.9%
7.1%

6
16

21.4%
57.1%
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PMSER Sample
Unsure
Sample 6
Legitimate
Potentially Malicious
Unsure
Sample 7
Legitimate
Potentially Malicious
Unsure
Sample 8
Legitimate
Potentially Malicious
Unsure
Sample 9
Legitimate
Potentially Malicious
Unsure
Sample 10
Legitimate
Potentially Malicious
Unsure
Sample 11
Legitimate
Potentially Malicious
Unsure
Sample 12
Legitimate
Potentially Malicious
Unsure

Frequency Percentage
6
21.4%
7
20
1

25%
71.4%
3.6%

22
4
2

7.8%
14.3%
7.1%

5
20
3

17.9%
17.9%
10.7%

21
6
1

75%
21.4%
3.6%

21
4
3

75%
14.3%
10.7%

25
2
1

89.3%
7.1%
3.6%

10
15
3

35.7%
53.6%
10.7%

The SMEs were also asked to provide feedback on whether to keep, revise, or replace the
PMSER samples they evaluated from Table 9. As shown in Table 10, most SMEs chose to keep
all the PMSER samples. The SMEs were also asked to provide feedback on why they chose the
revise or replace options and any additional feedback that might improve the PMSER samples.
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As with the sample email feedback on the revisions, the image quality will be adjusted on all
samples to be more readable for all participants.
Table 10
SME Feedback on PMSER Sample Edits (N=28)
PMSER Sample
Please provide your expert opinion about the PMSER sample above
by indicating: Keep, Revise, or Replace
Sample 1
Keep
Revise
Replace
Sample 2
Keep
Revise
Replace
Sample 3
Keep
Revise
Replace
Sample 4
Keep
Revise
Replace
Sample 5
Keep
Revise
Replace
Sample 6
Keep
Revise
Replace
Sample 7
Keep
Revise
Replace
Sample 8
Keep
Revise

Frequency Percentage

26
1
1

92.9%
3.6%
3.6%

23
3
2

82.1%
10.7%
7.1%

25
2
1

89.3%
7.1%
3.6%

25
1
2

89.3%
3.6%
7.1%

19
7
2

67.9%
25%
7.1%

25
2
1

89.3%
7.1%
3.6%

24
3
1

85.7%
10.7%
3.6%

25
2

89.3%
7.1%
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PMSER Sample
Replace
Sample 9
Keep
Revise
Replace
Sample 10
Keep
Revise
Replace
Sample 11
Keep
Revise
Replace
Sample 12
Keep
Revise
Replace

Frequency Percentage
1
3.6%
27
0
1

96.4%
0%
3.6%

27
0
1

96.4%
0%
3.6%

27
0
1

96.4%
0%
3.6%

25
1
2

89.3%
3.6%
7.1%

The SMEs were asked to evaluate the mobile phone and computer users' topmost and
least distracting environments. Table 11 indicates that 50% of the SMEs found that an airport
was the most distracting environment for mobile phone and computer users. 35.7% of the SMEs
also found that a home environment was the least distracting for mobile phone and computer
users, with an office setting coming into a close second place.
Table 11
SME Feedback of Physical Distracting Environments (N=28)
Environment
Which physical environment provides the most distracting
environment for Mobile Phones and Computers?
Airport
Coffee Shop
Lecture Hall
Meeting
Which physical environment provides the least distracting
environment for Mobile Phones and Computers?

Frequency Percentage

14
5
0
9

50%
17.9%
0%
32.%1
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Environment
Frequency Percentage
Office Setting
8
28.6%
Home
10
35.7%
Hotel room
6
21.4%
Library/Bookstore
4
14.3%
The SMEs were asked to evaluate the topmost and least Audio/Visual (A/V) distraction
levels for mobile phone and computer users. Table 12 shows that 67.9% of the SMEs chose all
the above for the most distracting A/V distraction level, including continuous background noise,
visual distractions, and distracting/loud music. 46.4% of the SMEs chose all the above for the
most distracting A/V distraction level, including a quiet environment, relaxing background
music, and no visual distractions.
Table 12
SME Feedback of A/V Distraction Levels (N=28)
A/V Distraction Level
Which audio/visual distraction level is best for a distracting
environment for Mobile Phones and Computers?
Continuous Background Noise
Visual Distractions
Distracting/Loud Music
All of the above
Which audio/visual distraction level is best for a non-distracting
environment for Mobile Phones and Computers?
A Quiet Environment
Relaxing Background Music
No visual distractions
All of the above

Frequency Percentage

3
4
2
19

10.7%
14.3%
7.1%
67.9%

7
5
3
13

25%
19.9%
10.7%
46.4%

The SMEs were asked to evaluate the randomization table in Figure 3 and provide
feedback on whether to keep, revise, or replace the randomization. About 89.3% indicated that
the randomization table should be kept. The SMEs were also asked whether to keep, revise, or
replace the number of questions for each mini-IQ test with three questions each. About 75% of
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the SMEs responded that the number of mini-IQ questions should be kept to three. As with the
email and PMSER sample questions, the SMEs were asked to provide feedback on why they
chose the revised or replace options and any additional feedback that might improve the
randomization and question size.
Table 13
SME Feedback on Mini IQ Test Randomization (N=28)
Question
Please provide your expert opinion about the randomization table
above by indicating:
Keep
Revise
Replace
The mini-IQ tests will consist of three questions, each using the
randomization table above. Please provide your expert opinion
about the randomization and size of the mini-IQ tests by indicating:
Keep
Revise
Replace

Frequency Percentage

25
1
2

89.3%
3.6%
7.1%

21
6
1

75%
21.4%
3.6%

Figure 3 indicates the question randomization for the email and PMSER questions given
to the pilot study participants and the main research study participants. Randomization was
necessary to maintain the research study's quality and validity. The difficulty of the phishing and
PMSER questions is evenly distributed to reduce the chance that all easy questions are asked in
non-distracting environments, and all hard questions are asked in distracting environments.
The SMEs were asked to provide feedback on the pilot and experimental testing
procedures, as shown in Table 14, on whether to keep, revise, or replace each procedure. For the
pilot-testing procedures, 96.4% of the SMEs selected to keep the pilot testing procedure 1. For
pilot testing procedures 2 and 3, the SMEs responded with an 89.3% majority to keep the
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procedures. For experimental procedure 1, 92.9% of the SMEs chose to keep the procedure.
Experimental procedure 2 had an 89.3% majority for keeping the procedure. Finally, for
experimental procedure 3, there was an 85.7% majority to keep the procedure. The SMEs that
chose to revise or replace were asked to provide feedback on why they chose to revise or replace
options on all the procedures and any additional feedback that might improve the testing
procedures.
Table 14
Pilot Testing and Experimental Testing Procedures
Experimental Testing Procedure
Pilot Experimental Procedure 1: Post invitations on social media
such as LinkedIn
Keep
Revise
Replace
Pilot Experimental Procedure 2: Email interested pilot testing
participants a zoom meeting link to conduct pilot testing and assign
a participant ID.
Keep
Revise
Replace
Pilot Experimental Procedure 3: Pilot test participants were given
links to the mini-IQ tests to complete while in a monitored simulated
environment (distracting or non-distracting) via Zoom. Each
participant was asked to enter their assigned participant ID for each
IQ test for data tracking purposes.
Keep
Revise
Replace
Main Experimental Procedure 1: Post invitation on the testing site
organizational website and via organizational email.
Keep
Revise
Replace

Frequency Percentage

27
0
1

96.4%
0%
3.6%

25
2
1

89.3%
7.1%
3.6%

25
2
1

89.3%
7.1%
3.6%

26
0
2

92.9%
0%
7.1%
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Experimental Testing Procedure
Main Experimental Procedure 2: Email interested experimental
testing participants a zoom meeting link to conduct experimental
testing and assign a participant ID.
Keep
Revise
Replace
Main Experimental Procedure 3: Experimental test participants
were given links to the mini-IQ tests to complete while in a
monitored simulated environment (distracting or non-distracting)
via Zoom. Each participant was asked to enter their assigned
participant ID for each IQ test for data tracking purposes.
Keep
Revise
Replace

Frequency Percentage

25
2
1

89.3%
7.1%
3.6%

24
2
2

85.7%
7.1%
7.1%

Phase II – Pilot Testing
This study is experimental field research and documents the pilot testing phase conducted
with research volunteers to validate the set of experiments validated by the SMEs during the
Delphi round. The Expert Panel Research Design Process’s model is based on the work of
Tracey and Richey (2007), which uses the Delphi technique that uses a panel of SME analysis
and feedback (See Figure 3). The Delphi technique is a fundamental methodology in situations
where accurate information is not available, and expert judgment is needed (Ramim & Lichvar,
2014). The SME panel determined if the two sets of tasks and eight experimental protocols meet
understandability, answerability, and readability standards (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014).
Participants were asked to take four short Mini-IQ surveys using their mobile phones and
computers in non-distracting and distracting environments. This was important to finalize the
delivery method and data analysis for the mini-IQ tests for the phishing and PMSER
experiments. The participants were given instructions that included links for the non-distracting
environment phase and a zoom link for the distracting environment phase to be observed. This
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was important to ensure that the distracting sound file was played while taking the surveys. The
participants were then asked to identify the one sound in the sound file that distracted them the
most to ensure that they were distracted by the audio. The sound file was developed based on the
SME’s feedback in the Delphi rounds. Six soundtracks were combined into the sound file
consisting of crowd noise from an office and two airports, a crying baby, circus music, and a
random distracting sound found on YouTube.
Invitation emails to participate in the pilot testing surveys were sent to about 20 potential
participants to reach a 50% response rate or 10 respondents. 10 respondents participated in this
pilot test, answering questions based on the SME-validated tasks and procedures. Table 15
provides the descriptive statistics of the 10 participants during the pilot test, which took place in
December of 2021. The participants were both males and females, ages 30 to 59.
Table 15.
Descriptive Statistics of Pilot Test Participants (N=10)
Demographics Indicator
Age
18-19
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
Over 60
Gender
Female
Male
Education
High School Diploma
2-year College (Associates Degree)
4-year College (Bachelor’s degree)
Graduate degree
Doctorate/Professional

Frequency

Percentage

4
31
18
4
9
2+

5.9%
45.6%
26.5%
5.9%
13.2%
2.9%

36
32

52.9%
47.1%

29
17
20
25
3

42.6%
25%
8.8%
14.7%
8.8%
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Demographics Indicator
Social Media Usage
Never
Occasionally
Sometimes
Often

Frequency

Percentage

2
18
20
25

2.9%
26.5%
29.4%
36.8%

The participants’ educational backgrounds included highly educated pilot participants,
with 60% with Doctoral/Professional degrees and 40% with Graduate degrees. The participants’
social media usage had 50% Often, 30% Sometimes, 10% Occasionally, and 10% Never.
The mini-IQ tests were developed based on previous research to include a mixture of
phishing emails and potentially malicious and legitimate search engine links. Participants were
asked to identify if the image of an email or a search engine link was (a) Legitimate, (b)
Phishing/Potentially Malicious Link, or (c) Ask IT Department. There were three legitimate
emails, three legitimate links, nine non-legitimate emails, and nine non-legitimate links. For the
emails and PMSER links, to avoid user fatigue and have the user remember the social
engineering samples provided, a randomized list was generated to include easy, medium, and
hard to detect samples to ensure the level of detection is not constant as it is in confirmed cases
of social engineering
Phishing email and PMSER samples were then created following the three levels of
detection (easy, medium, & hard) for each social engineering type and were validated using SMEs.
Each response was coded based on the severity of the identified email or link, as indicated in Table
16. Moreover, for each mini-IQ test, three samples were provided, and scoring across all three was
summed, indicating a scoring from three (3x1) to 18 (3x6).
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Table 16.
Scoring of Mini-IQ Responses for Phishing and PMSER Selections
Actual
Non-Legitimate
Legitimate
Non-Legitimate
Legitimate
Legitimate
Non-Legitimate

Participant’s Selection
Non-Legitimate
Legitimate
Ask-IT Department
Ask-IT Department
Non-Legitimate
Legitimate

Score
6
5
4
3
2
1

Figure 10 summarizes the participant results from the aggregated testing data across all
eight mini-IQ tests on the two devices, two environments, and two types of social engineering
simulated attacks. The phishing mini-IQ test results do not follow what was initially indicated in
prior literature. Specifically, it was surprising to learn that the non-distracting environment
results for the Phishing IQ tests were overall lower than those of distracting environment, which
is counter to what was envisioned (See Figure 10 & Figure 11a).
Figure 10.
Pilot Test Summary of Participants' Results (N=10)

These Phishing IQ test results may be assumed to be because, during the distracting
environment, the participants were monitored over zoom to enable the distracting sound file. In
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contrast, in the non-distracting environment, they have marked the selections independently and
may have rushed to identify the phishing samples. Additionally, counter to the initial expectation
from literature, it was found that computer users from our pilot results in a non-distracting
environment resulted in the lowest scoring. In contrast, computer users in distracting
environments appeared to have scored the highest, again counterintuitive results. They may
require further investigation during this study's full data collection results (See Figure 10 &
Figure 11b). However, the PMSER IQ test results were as expected, with overall scores on both
mobile and computer in a distracting environment being lower than those in a non-distracting
environment.
In contrast, PMSER detection on a computer outperformed mobile devices. It is
suspected that these results are more accurate as individuals’ familiarity with PMSER is much
lower. Their habituation to such messages is more deficient, causing them to pay closer attention
and be more precise in their detections. A two-way ANOVA was conducted on the results. While
it appears that some variations do exist, as presented in Table 17 and Figure 10, none of the
comparisons were significant for Phishing IQ tests by environment (F=3.714, p=0.061) or device
type (F=0.380, p=0.541), and PMSER IQ tests by environment (F=1.383, p=0.247) or device
type (F=0.228, p=0.636).
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Figure 11.
Results of the Pilot Mini-IQ Tests for Phishing IQ (a) and PMSER (b)

A two-way ANCOVA was also conducted on the overall scores of all eight mini-IQ tests
based on the demographics indicators and found that, at least from the results of this pilot study,
no demographics indicator evaluated provided any significant differences among the pilot study
participants.
Phase III - Main Research Study
This study is experimental field research and documents the main research testing phase
conducted with research volunteers to validate the set of experiments validated by the pilot
testing phase and the SMEs during the Delphi round. The Expert Panel Research Design
Process’s model is based on the work of Tracey and Richey (2007), which uses the Delphi
technique that uses a panel of SME analysis and feedback (See Figure 3). The Delphi technique
is a fundamental methodology in situations where accurate information is not available, and
expert judgment is needed (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). The SME panel determined if the two sets
of tasks and eight experimental protocols meet understandability, answerability, and readability
standards (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014).
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Participants were asked to take four short Mini-IQ surveys using their mobile phones and
computers in non-distracting and distracting environments. The participants were given revised
instructions in Appendix J that included links for the non-distracting environment phase and a
zoom link for the distracting environment phase to be observed. This was important to ensure
that the distracting sound file was played while taking the surveys. The instructions had to be
revised from the pilot study because participants had difficulty following the current instructions
as written. The participants were then asked to identify the one sound in the sound file that
distracted them the most to ensure that they were distracted by the audio. The sound file was
developed based on the SME’s feedback in the Delphi rounds. Six soundtracks were combined
into the sound file consisting of crowd noise from an office and two airports, a crying baby,
circus music, and a random distracting sound found on YouTube.
Phase III – Pre-Analysis Data Screening
There were 68 total participants in this study. Invitation emails to participate in the main
testing surveys were sent to about 500 potential participants from Tidewater Community College
to reach a 10% response rate of 50 respondents. A group of 68 respondents participated in this
main research testing, answering questions based on the adjustments made after the pilot testing
phase. IBM SPSS Statistics version 27 was used to analyze the scored answers of the main
research study participants.
Phase III - Participant Demographics Characteristics
Table 17 provides the descriptive statistics of the 68 participants during the main, from
January to March of 2022. The participants were both males and females, ages 18 to over 60.
Gender was evenly distributed with 36 female participants and 32 male participants.
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Table 17
Descriptive Statistics of Main Study Participants (N=68)
Demographics Indicator
Age
18-19
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
Over 60
Gender
Female
Male
Education
High School Diploma
2-year College (Associates
Degree)
4-year College (Bachelor’s
degree)
Graduate degree
Doctorate/Professional
Social Media Usage
Never
Occasionally
Sometimes
Often
Always

Frequency

Percentage

4
31
18
4
9
2

5.9%
45.6%
26.5%
5.9%
13.2%
2.9%

36
32

52.9%
47.1%

29

42.6%

17

25%

20

8.8%

25
3

14.7%
8.8%

2
18
20
25
3

2.9%
26.5%
29.4%
36.8%
4.4%

The participants’ educational backgrounds included participants from the whole
education spectrum, with 8.8% with Doctoral/Professional degrees, 14.7% with Graduate
degrees, 8.8% with 4-year College (Bachelor’s degrees), 25% with 2-year College (Associates
Degrees), and 42.6% with High School Diplomas. The participants’ social media usage had 3%
always, 36.8% Often, 29.4% Sometimes, 26.5% Occasionally, and 2.9% Never.
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Phase III – Data Scoring
The mini-IQ tests were developed based on previous research to include a mixture of
phishing emails and potentially malicious and legitimate search engine links. Participants were
asked to identify if the image of an email or a search engine link was legitimate and given a
seven-answer scale 1) Strongly Disagree, 2) Disagree, 3) Somewhat Disagree, 4) Neither Agree
nor Disagree, 5) Somewhat Agree, 6) Agree, 7) Strongly Agree, as shown in Table 18, to score
their level of agreement. After viewing the pilot study results, these answer choices were revised
from a three-answer scale 1) Legitimate, 2) Phishing/potentially Malicious, 3) Ask IT
Department to improve the statistical measures and level of agreement. This change was
supported by reviewing the SME feedback, in which some of the respondents suggested that
having three answer choices was not adequate. There were three legitimate emails, three
legitimate links, nine non-legitimate emails, and nine non-legitimate links. For the emails and
PMSER links, to avoid user fatigue and have the user remember the social engineering samples
provided, a randomized list was generated to include easy, medium, and hard to detect samples
to ensure the level of detection is not constant as it is in confirmed cases of social engineering.

Table 18
Mini IQ Test-Revised Survey Answers
Answer Choice

Level of Agreement

1

Strongly Disagree

2

Disagree

3

Somewhat Disagree

4

Neither Agree or Disagree

5

Somewhat Agree
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Answer Choice

Level of Agreement

6

Agree

7

Strongly Agree

Phishing email and PMSER samples were then created following the three levels of
detection (easy, medium, & hard) for each social engineering type and were validated using SMEs.
Each response was coded based on the severity of the identified email or link, as indicated in Table
19. Moreover, seven samples were provided for each mini-IQ test, and scoring across all seven
was summed, indicating a scoring from seven (7x1) to 10. Some of the scores were given equal
weights to assign the same score to opposite sides of the spectrum for correct or incorrect answers
from the participants.
Table 19.
Scoring of Mini-IQ Responses for Phishing and PMSER Selections
Actual
Non-Legitimate
Legitimate
Non- Legitimate
Legitimate
Legitimate
Non- Legitimate
Legitimate
Non- Legitimate
Legitimate
Non- Legitimate
Non- Legitimate
Legitimate
Legitimate
Non- Legitimate

Participant’s Selection
Strongly disagree
Strongly agree
Disagree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree or disagree
Neither agree or disagree
Somewhat disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Strongly agree

Score
10
10
9
8
7
6
6
5
5
4
3
2
1
1
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Phase III Findings
Figure 12 summarizes the participant results from the aggregated testing data across all
eight mini-IQ tests on the two devices, two environments, and two types of social engineering
simulated attacks. The phishing mini-IQ test results now follow what was initially indicated in
prior literature for mobile devices with lower mean scores than computers due to smaller screen
sizes. However, the score for the computer is slightly higher than the non-distracting
environment. Specifically, results for the Phishing IQ and PMSER tests were overall lower for
the mobile devices than those of the computers in a distracting environment, which is what was
envisioned (See Figure 12 & Figure 13a).
The anomalous scores for the computer in a distracting environment and a mobile phone
in a non-distracting environment could be from survey fatigue. The 29 and under demographic
group appears to be habituated to using the smaller display size on mobile devices. It is assumed
that these Phishing and PMSER IQ test results may be because, during the distracting
environment, the participants were monitored over zoom to enable the distracting sound file. In
contrast, in the non-distracting environment, they have marked the selections independently and
may have rushed to identify the phishing samples.
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Figure 10
Main Study Summary of Participants' Results (N=68)

Additionally, it was found that mobile users from our main research resulted in a
distracting environment with the lowest scoring, which is in line with prior literature. In contrast,
computer users in distracting environments appeared to have scored the highest, which are
counterintuitive results. They may require further investigation with this study's full data
collection results (See Figure 12 & Figure 13b). However, the PMSER IQ test results were as
expected, with overall scores on both mobile and computer in a distracting environment being
lower than those in a non-distracting environment.
In contrast, PMSER detection on a computer outperformed mobile devices. It is
suspected that these results are more accurate as individuals’ familiarity with PMSER is much
lower. Their habituation to such messages is more deficient, causing them to pay closer attention
and be more precise in their detections. A two-way ANOVA was conducted on the results. While
it appears that some variations do exist, as presented in Figure 12 and Figure 13, none of the
comparisons were significant for Phishing IQ tests by environment (F=0.985, p=0.322) or device
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type (F=2.413, p=0.122) and PMSER IQ tests by environment (F=3.692, p=0.056) or device type
(F=1.195, p=0.275).
Figure 13.
Results of the Main Study Mini-IQ Tests for Phishing IQ (a) and PMSER (b)

A two-way ANCOVA was also conducted on the overall scores of all eight mini-IQ tests
based on the demographics indicators and found that, at least from the results of this main
research study, the Education demographics indicator showed significant differences among the
main research study participants.
Phase III RQ3
Are there significant mean differences in users’ judgment when exposed to two types of
simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER) in distracting vs. non-distracting
environments? A two-way ANOVA was evaluated for significant differences between groups.
The results of the two-way ANOVA showed there were no significant differences among both
groups for Phishing and PMSER. Phishing (F=0.985, p=0.322), PMSER (F=3.692, p=0.056).
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The p-values of the F-test were greater than the .05 level of significance. Results are shown in
Table 20 and Table 21.
Table 20
ANOVA Results of Phishing IQ vs. Environment (N=68)
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
Environment
Error
Total
Corrected Total

Type III Sum of
Squares
24.721a
94205.309
24.721
6775.971
101006.000
6800.691

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

1
1
1
270
272
271

24.721
94205.309
24.721
25.096

.985
3753.770
.985

.322
.000
.322

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

1
1
1
270
272
271

72.059
88994.118
72.059
19.518

3.692
4559.624
3.692

.056
.000
.056

Table 21
ANOVA Results of PMSER IQ vs. Environment (N=68)
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
Environment
Error
Total
Corrected Total

Type III Sum of
Squares
72.059a
88994.118
72.059
5269.824
94336.000
5341.882

This section represents the results of descriptive statistics between groups for Phishing IQ
and PMSER IQ vs. Environment among all 68 participants. Descriptive statistics for RQ3 are
shown in Table 22 and Table 23. The results show that the research participants performed worse
in distracting environments based on the mean comparisons in Table 23 and Table 24, including
graphical representation in Figures 14 and Figure15 for estimated marginal means.
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Table 22
Descriptive Statistics of Phishing IQ vs. Environment (N=68)
Environment

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Distracting (1)
Non-Distracting (2)

18.31
18.91

5.498
4.468

136
136

Total

18.61

5.009

272

Figure 14
Mean Score for Phishing IQ vs. Environment (N=68)

Table 23
Descriptive Statistics of PMSER IQ vs. Environment (N=68)
Environment

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Distracting (1)
Non-Distracting (2)

17.57
18.60

4.123
4.694

136
136

Total

18.09

4.440

272
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Figure 15
Mean Score for PMSER IQ vs. Environment (N=68)

Phase III RQ4
Are there significant mean differences in users’ judgment when exposed to two types of
simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER) when using a mobile phone vs. a
computer? A two-way ANOVA was evaluated for significant differences between groups. The
results of the two-way ANOVA showed there were no significant differences among both groups
for Phishing and PMSER. Phishing (F=2.413, p=0.122), PMSER (F=1.195, p=0.275). The pvalues of the F-test were greater than the .05 level of significance. Results are shown in Table 24
and Table 25.
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Table 24
ANOVA Results of Phishing IQ vs. Device Type (N=68)

Corrected Model
Intercept

Type III Sum of
Squares
60.235a
94205.309

Device Type
Error

60.235
6740.456

1
270

Total

101006.000

272

Corrected Total

6800.691

271

Source

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

1
1

60.235
94205.309

2.413
3773.548

.122
.000

60.235
24.965

2.413

.122

Table 25
ANOVA Results of PMSER IQ vs. Device Type (N=68)
df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Corrected Model
Intercept
Device Type
Error

Type III Sum of
Squares
23.529a
88994.118
23.529
5318.353

1
1
1
270

23.529
88994.118
23.529
19.698

1.195
4518.018
1.195

.275
.000
.275

Total

94336.000

272

Corrected Total

5341.882

271

Source

This section represents the results of descriptive statistics between groups for Phishing IQ
and PMSER IQ vs. Device Type among all 68 participants. Descriptive statistics for RQ4 are shown
in Table 28 and Table 29. Based on mean comparisons in Table 26 and Table 27, including graphical
representation in Figure 16 and Figure 17 for estimated marginal means, the computers outperformed
the mobile devices.
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Table 26
Descriptive Statistics of Phishing IQ vs. Device Type (N=68)
Device Type
Mobile (1)
Computer (2)
Total

Mean
18.14
19.08
18.61

Std. Deviation
5.045
4.947
5.009

N
136
136
272

Figure 16
Mean Score for Phishing IQ vs. Device Type (n=68)

Table 27
Descriptive Statistics of PMSER IQ vs. Device Type (N=68)
Device Type
Mobile (1)
Computer (2)
Total

Mean
17.79
18.38
18.09

Std. Deviation
4.702
4.158
4.440

N
136
136
272
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Figure 17
Mean Score for PMSER IQ vs. Device Type (n=68)

Phase III RQ5
Are there statistically significant mean differences in users’ judgment when exposed to
two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER), based on the interaction
of the kind of environment (distracting vs. non-distracting) and type of device used (mobile
phone vs. computer)? A two-way ANOVA was evaluated for significant differences between
groups. The results of the two-way ANOVA showed there were significant differences among
both groups for Phishing and PMSER vs. Device Type and Environment. Phishing (F=3.685,
p=0.013), PMSER (F=1.629, p=0.183). The p-values of the F-test for the Phishing IQ vs. Device
Type and Environment were lower than the .05 level of significance. Results are shown in Table
28 and Table 29.
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Table 28
ANOVA Results of Phishing IQ vs. Device Type and Environment (N=68)
Source

Type III Sum
of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Corrected Model

269.426a

3

89.809

3.685

.013

Intercept

94205.309

1

94205.309

3865.564

.000

Environment

24.721

1

24.721

1.014

.315

Device Type
Environment * Device
Type
Error

60.235

1

60.235

2.472

.117

184.471

1

184.471

7.569

.006

6531.265

268

24.370

Total

101006.000

272

Corrected Total

6800.691

271

Table 29
ANOVA Results of PMSER IQ vs. Device Type and Environment (N=68)
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
Environment
Device Type
Environment * Device
Type
Error
Total
Corrected Total

Type III Sum
of Squares
95.647a
88994.118
72.059
23.529

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

3
1
1
1

31.882
88994.118
72.059
23.529

1.629
4546.198
3.681
1.202

.183
.000
.056
.274

.059

1

.059

.003

.956

5246.235
94336.000
5341.882

268
272
271

19.576

This section represents the results of descriptive statistics between groups for Phishing IQ
and PMSER IQ vs. Device Type and Environment among all 68 participants. Descriptive statistics
for RQ5 are shown in Table 30 and Table 31. Based on mean comparisons shown in Table 31 and
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Table 32, including graphical representation in Figure 18 and Figure 19 for estimated marginal
means, the computer outperformed the mobile device for all PMSER measures. However, for the
Phishing IQ, the mobile device outperformed the computer slightly in a non-distracting environment.

Table 30
Descriptive Statistics of Phishing IQ vs. Device Type (Mobile (1) and Computer (2)) and
Environment (N=68)
Environment

Distracting (1)

Non-Distracting (2)

Total

Device Type

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Mobile (1)

17.01

5.533

68

Computer (2)

19.60

5.186

68

Total

18.31

5.498

136

Mobile (1)

19.26

4.255

68

Computer (2)

18.56

4.676

68

Total

18.91

4.468

136

Mobile (1)

18.14

5.045

136

Computer (2)

19.08

4.947

136

Total

18.61

5.009

272
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Figure 18
Mean Score for Phishing IQ vs. Device Type (Mobile (1) and Computer (2)) and Environment
(N=68)

Table 31
Descriptive Statistics of PMSER IQ vs. Type (Mobile (1) and Computer (2)) and Environment
(N=68)
Environment
Distracting (1)

Non-Distracting
(2)

Total

Device Type
Mobile (1)
Computer (2)
Total
Mobile (1)
Computer (2)
Total
Mobile (1)
Computer (2)
Total

Mean
17.26
17.88
17.57
18.32
18.88
18.60
17.79
18.38
18.09

Std. Deviation
4.464
3.760
4.123
4.903
4.494
4.694
4.702
4.158
4.440

N
68
68
136
68
68
136
136
136
272
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Figure 19
Mean Score for PMSER IQ vs. Type (Mobile (1) and Computer (2)) and Environment (N=68)

Phase III RQ6
Are there any significant mean differences in users’ judgment when exposed to two types
of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER) when controlled for the users’: (a)
age, (b) gender, (c) education, and (d) level of social media usage? A two-way ANCOVA was
used to evaluate for significant differences between groups. The results of the two-way
ANCOVA showed there were significant differences among both groups for Phishing vs.
Environment and Device Type plus PMSER vs. Environment and Device Type. Phishing vs.
Environment (F=1.521, p=0.183), Phishing vs. Device Type (F=1.817, p=0.110) PMSER vs.
Environment (F=3.779, p=0.003), and PMSER vs. Device Type (F=3.230, p=0.008). The pvalues of the F-test for the PMSER IQ vs. Environment and Device Type were lower than the
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.05 level of significance. Also, the Education covariate for Table 32(F=3.930, p=0.048), Table
33(F=3.951, p=0.048), Table 34(F=10.429, p=0.001), and Table 35(F=10.329, p=0.001) was
lower than the .05 level of significance. Results are shown in Table 32 and Table 33 for the
Phishing IQ and Table 34 and Table 35 for the PMSER IQ.
Table 32
ANCOVA Results of Phishing IQ vs. Environment with Demographic Covariates(N=68)
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
Age
Gender
Education
Social Media
Environment
Error
Total
Corrected Total

Type III Sum of
Squares
189.087a
2755.166
1.150
28.410
97.682
6.553
24.721
6611.605
101006.000
6800.691

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

5
1
1
1
1
1
1
266
272
271

37.817
2755.166
1.150
28.410
97.682
6.553
24.721
24.856

1.521
110.847
.046
1.143
3.930
.264
.995

.183
.000
.830
.286
.048
.608
.320

Table 33
ANCOVA Results of Phishing IQ vs. Device Type with Demographic Covariates(N=68)
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
Age
Gender
Education
Social Media
Device Type
Error
Total

Type III Sum of
Squares
224.601a
2755.166
1.150
28.410
97.682
6.553
60.235
6576.090
101006.000

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

5
1
1
1
1
1
1
266
272

44.920
2755.166
1.150
28.410
97.682
6.553
60.235
24.722

1.817
111.445
.047
1.149
3.951
.265
2.436

.110
.000
.829
.285
.048
.607
.120
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Source
Corrected Total

Type III Sum of
Squares
6800.691

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

271

Table 34
ANCOVA Results of PMSER IQ vs. Environment with Demographic Covariates(N=68)
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
Age
Gender
Education
Social Media
Environment
Error
Total
Corrected Total

Type III Sum of
Squares
354.318a
2461.733
12.577
17.825
195.548
6.582
72.059
4987.564
94336.000
5341.882

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

5
1
1
1
1
1
1
266
272
271

70.864
2461.733
12.577
17.825
195.548
6.582
72.059
18.750

3.779
131.291
.671
.951
10.429
.351
3.843

.003
.000
.414
.330
.001
.554
.051

Table 35
ANCOVA Results of PMSER IQ vs. Device Type with Demographic Covariates(N=68)
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
Age
Gender
Education
Social Media
Device Type
Error
Total
Corrected Total

Type III Sum of
Squares
305.789a
2461.733
12.577
17.825
195.548
6.582
23.529
5036.093
94336.000
5341.882

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

5
1
1
1
1
1
1
266
272
271

61.158
2461.733
12.577
17.825
195.548
6.582
23.529
18.933

3.230
130.026
.664
.941
10.329
.348
1.243

.008
.000
.416
.333
.001
.556
.266
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This section represents the results of descriptive statistics between groups for Phishing IQ
and PMSER IQ vs. Device Type and Environment, including the four demographic covariates
among all 68 participants. Descriptive statistics for RQ6 are shown in Table 36, Table 37, Table
38, and Table 39. Based on mean comparisons shown in Table 36, Table 37, Table 38, and Table
39, including graphical representation in Figure 20, Figure 21, Figure 22, and Figure 23 for
estimated marginal means, the computer outperformed the mobile device for all measures and
the distracting environment performed better than the non-distracting environment as expected.
Table 36
Descriptive Statistics of Phishing IQ vs. Environment with Demographic Covariates (N=68)
Environment

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Distracting (1)

18.31

5.498

136

Non-Distracting (2)

18.91

4.468

136

Total

18.61

5.009

272
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Figure 20
Mean Score for Phishing IQ vs. Environment with Demographic Covariates (N=68)

Table 37
Descriptive Statistics of Phishing IQ vs. Device Type with Demographic Covariates (N=68)
Device Type

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Mobile (1)

18.14

5.045

136

Computer (2)

19.08

4.947

136

Total

18.61

5.009

272
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Figure 21
Mean Score for Phishing IQ vs. Device Type with Demographic Covariates (N=68)

Table 38
Descriptive Statistics of PMSER IQ vs. Environment with Demographic Covariates (N=68)
Environment

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Distracting (1)

17.57

4.123

136

Non-Distracting (2)

18.60

4.694

136

Total

18.09

4.440

272
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Figure 22
Mean Score for PMSER IQ vs. Environment with Demographic Covariates (N=68)

Table 39
Descriptive Statistics of PMSER IQ vs. Device Type with Demographic Covariates (N=68)
Device Type

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Mobile (1)

17.79

4.702

136

Computer (2)

18.38

4.158

136

Total

18.09

4.440

272
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Figure 23
Mean Score for PMSER IQ vs. Device Type with Demographic Covariates (N=68)
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Chapter 5

Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary
Conclusions
This study presents the results of the experimental testing process previously validated by
the SMEs to assess users’ judgment when exposed to two types of simulated social engineering
attacks (phishing & PMSER) during two kinds of environments (distracting vs. non-distracting)
and two types of devices (mobile phone vs. computer). This study is relevant as it seeks to
identify the vulnerabilities of information systems users exposed to two types of simulated social
engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER), which adversaries commonly use to gain access to an
individual’s personal or organizational accounts for monetary gain. With the widespread use of
mobile phones with Internet-connected applications, phishing attempts have increased through
social engineering through scams and clickbait links. Frauenstein and Flowerday (2016) stated
that users pick up bad habits by using link-sharing applications that leave them vulnerable to
phishing attacks. These bad habits make it harder for people to discern between genuine and
malicious links making them more susceptible to phishing attacks. Moreover, the significance of
this research is in its potential to advance the current research in cybersecurity by increasing the
body of knowledge regarding users’ judgment when exposed to two types of simulated social
engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER). Distracting environments at work and in public make
it easier for a user to have errors in judgment when performing tasks. Attackers craft phishing
attacks to try and distort the mental model users form in interacting with online transactions and
distract them from the visual cues they usually notice. As the number of distractions increases,
cognitive cues decrease, affecting decision-making due to cognitive overload (Kahneman, 1973).
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The results of this study provide initial input to the body of knowledge of users’ susceptibility to
social engineering attacks in distracting environments while using mobile phones and computers.
Discussion
Like any research study, this study has several limitations. The main limitation of this
pilot testing procedure is that all interactions with the participants were conducted remotely due
to COVID-19 restrictions. All measures have been taken to ensure that the distracting and nondistracting environments mimic reality. Still, it is understandably valid that users may be
preconditioned during an experiment versus the full impact of such environments in natural
settings. Another limitation was that the participants were limited to identifying phishing and
PMSER samples to graphical images only due to limitations of survey distributions. This
limitation can be mitigated by having an application created to hover over links to see if they
lead to where they indicate. Another limitation was that the instructions for the testing
procedures had to be changed a few times to ensure that our message was clear to the study
participants on what they were asked to do. Our recruitment of research participants that had
experience in pilot testing procedures helped mitigate this limitation. This change did help with
the overall completion of the main study. One last limitation is that the survey instruments did
not allow research participants to hover over links to determine whether a phishing email or SER
was valid. All care was taken in the design process to try and mitigate this limitation, but this
limitation could not be mitigated altogether.
Implications
There are several implications for cybersecurity, social awareness, and phishing
susceptibility reduction. This study implicates that reducing distracting environments in the
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workplace, at home, and in public may significantly reduce social engineering susceptibility.
This study also implicates that education level may play a significant role in social engineering
susceptibility. Having a robust training program for the workforce may significantly reduce
social engineering susceptibility in the workplace.
Implications for Practice
Organizations could potentially reduce the severity of social engineering for both
organizational and personal data loss by implementing training programs that help increase user
awareness of the potential dangers of distracting environments and help identify social engineering
attempts to gain access to organizational data and systems.

Implications for Research
Implications for research indicate additional discovery on what phishing and PMSER IQ
combinations could be created to increase further ability to notice social engineering attempts
through phishing emails and malicious SERs. A more controlled environment during testing
phases may also help improve the testing scores in distracting and non-distracting environments
to see if there are significant mean differences between device type and environment. This
research had a high level of high school graduates under the education demographic (40%)
compared to the rest of the education levels. This potential limitation can be mitigated by
recruiting from a more diverse pool that is more representative of the current population outside
of an educational institution. Having a more balanced demographic pool based on age, gender,
education level, and social media usage may help identify if more demographic covariate factors
have a significant mean difference when exposed to two types of simulated social engineering
attacks (phishing & PMSER) during two kinds of environments (distracting vs. non-distracting)
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and two types of devices (mobile phone vs. computer). Having the ability to add visual
distractions into the experiment would also likely improve the quality of research. Also, adding
distractions such as pop-up windows, notifications, and text notifications would add a layer of
realism to the testing of mobile phones and computers.

Recommendations and Future Research
Another round of testing in a more controlled environment during testing should be
performed. This change may help improve the testing scores in distracting and non-distracting
environments to see if there are significant mean differences between device type and
environment. Some surprising results occurred during the pilot testing phase. Unexpected results
such as this may need to be investigated further to see if any new facts are discovered that can
contribute to the body of knowledge or identify potential flaws in the research. Prior literature
indicated that various demographic indicators such as age, gender, education, and level of social
media usage, also play a role in phishing judgmental errors (Frauenstein & Flowerday, 2016;
Sheng et al., 2010). Thus, additional assessments of the experimental data with the interaction of
different demographic indicators may help further uncover potential groups that are more
susceptive to social engineering attacks.
Summary
In summary, this research assessed users’ susceptibility to social engineering attacks in
distracting and non-distracting environments while using mobile phones and computers.
The main research question (RQ) that this study addressed was: Are there any statistically
significant mean differences in users’ judgment when: exposed to two types of simulated social
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engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER), based on the interaction of the kind of environment
(distracting vs. non-distracting) and type of device used (mobile phone vs. computer) and
included RQ1, RQ2, RQ3, RQ4, RQ5, and RQ6:
RQ1. What are the specific SMEs identified two sets of validated experimental tasks to
assess users’ judgment when exposed to two types of simulated social engineering
attacks (phishing & PMSER)?
RQ2. What are the specific SMEs identified eight experimental protocols to assess the
measures of users’ judgment when exposed to two types of simulated social
engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER), in two kinds of environments
(distracting vs. non-distracting) and two types of devices (mobile phone vs.
computer)?
RQ3. Are there significant mean differences in users’ judgment when exposed to two
types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER) in distracting
vs. non-distracting environments?
RQ4. Are there significant mean differences in users’ judgment when exposed to two
types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER) when using a
mobile phone vs. a computer?
RQ5: Are there statistically significant mean differences in users’ judgment when
exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER),
based on the interaction of the kind of environment (distracting vs. non-distracting)
and type of device used (mobile phone vs. computer)?
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RQ6: Are there any significant mean differences in users’ judgment when exposed to
two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER) when
controlled for the users’: (a) age, (b) gender, (c) education, and (d) level of social
media usage?
Phase I answered RQ1 through the SMEs, validating the two types of simulated social
engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER) based on the interaction of the kind of environment
(distracting vs. non-distracting) and type of device used (mobile phone vs. computer)? RQ2 was
answered by the SMEs, validating eight experimental protocols to assess the measures of users’
judgment when exposed to two types of simulated social engineering attacks (phishing &
PMSER) in two kinds of environments (distracting vs. non-distracting) and two types of devices
(mobile phone vs. computer)? The phishing and PMSER IQ tests were paired with SMEvalidated physical and AV environmental factors for testing in a remote environment.
Phase II included building the surveys and pilot testing the SME validated tasks and
measures from RQ1 and RQ2. The participants' instructions for accessing the surveys for the
non-distracting environmental testing also included some FAQs and the email address to contact
us to set up testing appointments for the distracting environment testing. A Zoom link was also
provided to monitor the participants during the distracting environment testing phase.
Phase III included recruitment and the delivery of the testing instructions and the testing
participation of the respondents who answered the following research questions RQ3, RQ4,
RQ5, and RQ6.
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RQ3 and RQ4 were answered by evaluating the research data with a two-way ANOVA.
The results of the two-way ANOVA showed there were no significant differences among both
groups for Phishing and PMSER.
RQ5 was answered by evaluating the research data with a two-way ANOVA. The results
of the two-way ANOVA showed there were significant differences among both groups for
Phishing and PMSER vs. Device Type and Environment.
RQ6 was answered by evaluating the research data with a two-way ANCOVA. The
results of the two-way ANCOVA showed there were significant differences among both groups
for Phishing vs. Environment and Device Type plus PMSER vs. Environment and Device Type.
Specifically, the Education covariate for Table 32(F=3.930, p=0.048), Table 33(F=3.951,
p=0.048), Table 34(F=10.429, p=0.001), and Table 35(F=10.329, p=0.001) was lower than the
.05 level of significance.
Overall, this study developed and evaluated an experimental testing process previously
validated by SMEs to assess users’ judgment when exposed to two types of simulated social
engineering attacks (phishing & PMSER) during two kinds of environments (distracting vs. nondistracting) and two types of devices (mobile phone vs. computer).
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Appendix A
Institutional Review Board Approval Letter
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Appendix B
Site Approval Letter
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Appendix C
Example of SME Recruitment E-mail
Dear Cybersecurity Experts,
I need your help in providing feedback on developing two sets of validated experimental
tasks and eight experimental protocols for my upcoming doctoral research study. I am a
Ph.D. Candidate in Information Assurance at the College of Computing and Engineering,
Nova Southeastern University (NSU), working under Dr. Yair Levy's supervision and a
member of his Levy CyLab.
My research seeks to assess users’ judgment when exposed to two types of simulated
social engineering attacks (phishing & Potentially Malicious Search Engine Results
(PMSER)). I am also seeking to develop eight experimental protocols to assess the
measures of users’ judgment when exposed to two types of simulated social engineering
attacks (phishing & PMSER), in two kinds of environments (distracting vs. nondistracting), and two types of devices (mobile phone vs. computer).
In this part of the research, I need your assistance in the validation of two sets of
experimental tasks for device vs. environment. The sets are as follows:
Set 1: Phishing
1. Mobile phone usage in distracting and non-distracting environments.
2. Computer usage in distracting and non-distracting environments.
Set 2: PMSER
1. Mobile phone usage in distracting and non-distracting environments.
2. Computer usage in distracting and non-distracting environments.
I also need your assistance in validating the eight experimental protocols measuring user
judgment errors in device vs. environment simulations. The eight protocols are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Distracted via Mobile Phone (phishing).
Not Distracted via Mobile Phone (phishing).
Distracted via computer (phishing).
Not Distracted via Computer (phishing).
Distracted via Mobile Phone (PMSER).
Not Distracted via Mobile Phone (PMSER).
Distracted via Computer (PMSER).
Not Distracted via Computer (PMSER).
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The information provided was used for this research study and in an aggregated form. No
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) was collected. As a participant, you agree to
keep all information regarding this research confidential and refrain from disclosing any
details related to this survey or its material. If you are willing to participate in developing
these research protocols, please respond to this e-mail. Upon receiving your reply, a
follow-up e-mail was sent to you with the research protocols for the device vs.
environment and the measurement of judgment errors.
Thank you in advance for your consideration. I appreciate your assistance and
contribution to this research study. Should you wish to receive the study's findings, please
indicate them with your reply to this e-mail. I was happy to provide you with information
about the academic research publication(s) resulting from this study.
Respectfully,
Tommy Pollock
Doctoral Candidate in Information Assurance
College of Computing and Engineering
Nova Southeastern University
tp809@mynsu.nova.edu
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Appendix D
Example of SME Participant Demographics Survey

110

111

112

Appendix E
Example of Experiment Participant Research Study Recruitment Flyer

113

Appendix F
Example of Experiment Participant General Informed Consent Form
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Appendix G
Example of Experiment Participant Demographic Questions
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Appendix H
Example of Experiment Participant Phishing Survey
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Appendix I
Example of Experiment Participant PMSER Questions
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Appendix J
Participant Research Recruiting Letter
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